Indonesia-Russia Naval Exercises More Surface Than Substance

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Indonesia suspended them in 2015 due to the two sides' ongoing dispute over the North Natuna Sea, Indonesian territorial waters that fall within China's nine-dash line claim to nearly all of the South China Sea. While these initial moves may jangle nerves in the US and among its allies, viewed in their broader context they are less dramatic.

For one, despite the official branding, this week's drills are not the first time Indonesia has held a naval exercise with Russia. The multilateral Komodo Exercise, held four times since 2014 and most recently in 2023, included Russia from the outset alongside the US, Japan and China, among others. Holding a smaller bilateral exercise with Russia may be a notable development, but it's hardly a step change.

Furthermore, while serving defense minister, Prabowo oversaw the ongoing intensification of Indonesia's defense ties with the US and its allies. In August, Indonesia signed a new defense pact with Australia, hailed by the latter as the most significant security agreement in the two neighbors' history, with Prabowo shepherding the agreement on Indonesia's side.

Super Garuda Shield, an annual military exercise involving Indonesia and the US plus aligned powers, grew in size and complexity under Prabowo's watch. This year, the exercise ran for a month from August 26 to September 26 and involved some 5,500 troops from Indonesia, the US, Japan, Singapore, the UK, Australia, Canada, France, Brazil, Brunei, India, South Korea, New Zealand and Thailand.

By comparison, the Orruda 2024 naval exercise being held with Russia now is clearly smaller in scale, lasting just four days and involving just a few hundred soldiers in total.

As one expert, who preferred to remain anonymous, bluntly put it:“It's kind of a pathetic exercise if you compare it with Garuda Shield. This is kind of like the change you give to a beggar after eating at a really good restaurant called Garuda Shield.”

Fauzan Malufti, a defense analyst and member of JATOSINT, which provides open-source intelligence on Indonesia's military, was less dismissive.

“Given the number of warships and the exercise materials, I don't think it's merely symbolic,” he said. However, Malufti agreed that if compared to exercises with Western powers, Orruda was clearly much smaller and less complex.

Zooming out, Prabowo's willingness to entertain warm ties with Russia and perhaps increase military cooperation can be viewed as part of Indonesia's traditional preference for non-bloc positioning.

Outreach to Russia and China in security matters could serve as a signal that close defense ties with the US do not mean Indonesia has sacrificed its room for geopolitical maneuver.

“I personally think Prabowo would like to replicate India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who positioned India as a member of the Quad but also meeting with Putin,” said Fitriani Bintang Timur, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute think tank.

She cited Prabowo's unexpected proposal of a peace plan for Ukraine at the Shangri-La summit in Singapore in 2023 as a sign of his aspirations to position Indonesia as an influential middle power on the world stage.