Operation 1027 Rapidly Changing Myanmar's Security Landscape

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Eight months after the first Operation 1027 campaign, which ended in a Chinese-brokered ceasefire in January, fighting resumed in northern Shan state, with many calling this the second phase of Operation 1027.

Although the NUG had limited involvement, the 3BHA is joined by the Mandalay People's Defense Forces (PDF), the Bama People's Liberation Army (BPLA), the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), reputedly capturing over 80 military bases and 60 towns, including recent seizures of Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Mogoke in northern Shan, and key border crossings with China.

Additionally, 3BHA's recent attempts to capture Lashio city, a commercial and administrative hub in northern Myanmar, signal that the Myanmar military faces unprecedented challenges on multiple fronts.

The military has resorted to aerial shelling to retain Lashio, which is the headquarters of the Northeast Military Command, one of the junta's 12 military regions. At least 39 civilians were killed within two weeks of fighting in Lashio. Inspired by Operation 1027's success, other EAOs have launched synchronized attacks nationwide.

The Arakan Army (AA) now almost fully controls northern Rakhine state and captured the strategic Thandwe airport on July 5. In northern Myanmar, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) controls all towns that border China.

Due to the lost territories in northern Shan, the military cannot reinforce its troops, resulting in repeated losses in the region. While the junta forces try to maintain control in central Myanmar's Bamar-majority heartland, the recent capture of Madaya and Singu townships in central Mandalay by the Mandalay People's Defense Force on July 17 has further shocked the military, leading to heavy artillery strikes.

The role of China

The 3BHA's military successes would not have been possible without the blessing of the Chinese government, as the 3BHA relies on China for weapons, ammunition, banking and other support.

Beijing appears to have shifted its long-standing support from the Myanmar military to favor the EAOs, partly to eradicate cybercrime syndicates and gambling operations targeting Chinese nationals in Myanmar border areas.

This shift also aligns with China's geostrategic and economic interests, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor project, which aims to build a deep-sea port in Rakhine state, providing China with access to the Indian Ocean from its southern province of Yunnan. Myanmar plays a vital part in China's Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping's US$1 trillion project that includes maritime, rail and road projects in Asia, Africa and Europe.

During the 3BHA attempts to capture Lashio, the Chinese-backed United Wa State Army (UWSA) intervened by sending over 2,000 of their troops to Tangyan town in northern Shan – a strong indication of expanding its territory.

The Wa army is the most powerful EAO in Myanmar, with an army of approximately 30,000 well-equipped soldiers and sophisticated weaponry including heavy artillery and helicopters from China.

The escalating conflict raises concerns for China due to potential revenue losses from border trade with Myanmar. However, China's willingness to punish the Myanmar military regime may be limited, as evidenced by recent visits from senior or ex-military leaders to China.

During former president Thein Sein's visit to Beijing on June 29, it was reported that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had asked Thein Sein to persuade Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to step down and form an interim government to pave the way for elections, reflecting Beijing's belief that dialogue is the only way forward, as the military cannot be eliminated.

A week later, following the resumption of the 3BHA offensive in northern Shan, junta Deputy Prime Minister Soe Win embarked on an official visit to Qingdao to attend the Green Development Forum and discussed border stability, elimination of online scan operations and the proposed election. This indicates China's significant influence over key actors on both sides in Myanmar.

Time for proactive Western action

While it remains uncertain whether the Myanmar military will be totally dismantled, the security landscape has shifted significantly, especially after Operation 1027.

The resistance therefore needs international community support now more than ever. There are fragmentation issues among resistance groups, particularly between the Bamar-majority NUG and minority EAOs, as well as within different EAOs themselves. The international community can play a crucial role in facilitating dialogues among these groups.