The candor is obvious from the many areas of disagreement between them, from trade tariffs to the future status of Taiwan, to name but two. What is more constructive in the relationship now is that Beijing and Washington appear to be committed to leave the February 2023 weather balloon incident behind them and prioritize face-to-face diplomacy over the megaphone variety. How far this will go to mend a relationship that is still characterized by deep distrust over each side's ultimate goals is, however, not clear.

Among the biggest issues for China are the set of tariffs that the US has placed on Chinese goods and the US concerns about security issues linked to Chinese technology. Donald Trump began an unprecedented trade war against China by imposing a 25% tariff on Chinese imports in 2018, when he was president. These measures, Beijing suspects , are tools the US is using to“suppress China's trade and technology development.”

Biden, whose hands are partly tied by strong and bipartisan anti-Chinese sentiment in the US Congress, will have done little to allay Xi's concerns when he pointed out“that the United States will continue to take necessary actions to prevent advanced US technologies from being used to undermine ... national security, without unduly limiting trade and investment.” Trump, for his part, is promising to go even farther if re-elected .

There is no obvious change either in Washington's Taiwan policy or in the importance that Beijing attaches to the issue. According to the Chinese statement on the Biden-Xi phone call:“The Taiwan question is the first red line that must not be crossed in China-U.S. relations.” Both sides' positions will be tested in the coming months, with the inauguration of Taiwan's new president in May.

Another significant factor is the strengthening of US military relations with its partners in Aukus , the tripartite security partnership between the US, Australia and the UK. The US also sees Japan and the Philipines as regional allies that may play a part in the volatile security situation in the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific more broadly.

Although undoubtedly important, the bilateral dimension is not the only aspect of the US-China relationship. Given the upending of the existing international order – first and foremost by the war in Ukraine and now by the escalating conflict across the Middle East – Washington and Beijing have a whole host of other potential flashpoints on their agenda that they will need to manage carefully.

North Korea's increasing belligerence is clearly a concern for the US and its allies in Asia. And while China may see Pyongyang as useful leverage against military encirclement, a full-blown confrontation on the Korean peninsula is unlikely to be in China's interest. Beijing's more nuanced approach to the issue became apparent at the end of March when it abstained from a resolution to extend sanctions against North Korea, while Russia vetoed the US draft resolution on the issue.

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Neither Washington nor Beijing is likely to be interested in yet further escalation in the Middle East. While China, together with Russia, vetoed an earlier US-sponsored resolution on a ceasefire for Gaza on March 22 2024, a subsequent vote three days later ended with China voting in favor and the US abstaining. This does not by any means indicate a convergence of interests between Washington and Beijing, but it signals that there is a bargaining space in which the two powers could find enough common ground between them to manage crises through existing international institutions like the United Nations.

Yet, there are likely limits to a more cooperative approach by Beijing and Washington to international security. This may be less about to their own desires and more about their ability to constrain allies. The recent Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus is as likely to be a test case in this regard as is Russia's continuing aggression in Ukraine. The Biden administration has so far proven unwilling, and perhaps unable, to use its full leverage over Israel. Xi, in turn, has been unwilling to pressure Putin and is unlikely to allow Russia to be humiliated in Ukraine.

For the foreseeable future, this means that Beijing and Washington by managing instability will, at best, be able to approach their shared but not wholly overlapping interests in international security. If they simultaneously find a way to keep their bilateral disagreements from escalating to conflict, there is every chance that this most consequential relationship will not fall victim to the Thucydides trap of an inevitable military confrontation.

Stefan Wolff is a professor of international security at the University of Birmingham .

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article .