Venezuela's Defaulted Bonds Just Rallied Hard - Here's What The Market Thinks Changed

(MENAFN- The Rio Times) Key Points

• Venezuela and PDVSA paper jumped 30%+ as political risk was repriced.
  
• Banks see higher odds of a deal, but still expect deep creditor losses.
  
• OFAC licensing, asset litigation, and oil cashflow constraints remain decisive.
  

Venezuela's defaulted sovereign bonds and PDVSA notes rallied after U.S. forces captured Nicolás Maduro and Delcy Rodríguez became acting president.

From January 4 to January 7, the Venezuela 2027 bond rose from 32.92 cents to 43.62 cents (+32.5%). PDVSA 's 2026 note climbed from 23.41 cents to 32.56 cents (+39%). Prices spiked on January 6 as volumes jumped, then stabilized.

Research desks frame the move as probability and timing, not solvency. Wells Fargo noted Venezuelan assets have doubled over the past 12 months since Trump took office in January 2025. Barclays warned bonds are already near recovery-value assumptions (35–45 cents).

Morgan Stanley sees about five points of near-term upside. Citi said prices still sit below its recovery view in the“high 40s.” UBS said Venezuela may face one of the most complex restructurings in modern history, and Citi compared the technical challenge to Greece's 2012 PSI.



The balance sheet explains why. Barclays has cited $56.5 billion of unsecured Venezuela and PDVSA eurobonds outstanding; with accrued interest, bond-market claims have been cited near $98.3 billion, about 119% of 2025 GDP.
Venezuela debt heavy bonds restructuring risk
Citi estimates total Venezuelan debt around $169 billion versus projected 2026 nominal GDP near $98 billion, implying roughly 173% debt-to-GDP and at least a 50% principal cut on external debt.

Its base-case sketch: a new 20-year bond with a 4.4% coupon, plus a 10-year no-coupon bond for accrued interest.

Citi also floated state-contingent“sweeteners,” pointing to Sri Lanka's nominal-GDP-linked design and Zambia's copper triggers; for Venezuela, extra payments could be tied to independently verified net oil export revenues.

Execution is the minefield: OFAC licensing, the CITGO-linked pledge in PDVSA's 2020 bond, and questions over whether reinvestment and expropriation-compensation claims could outrank bondholders.

With infrastructure degraded and exports facing reported bottlenecks and output cuts, the rally looks like a bet on process-not proof of recovery.

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