Maritime shipping keeps the global economy upright. It is the quiet machinery that most people never see: Eight out of every ten goods moved in world trade travel by sea, and for developing economies, the dependence is even sharper. Many small island states and lower-income countries lean on their ports almost twice as much as the global average. When these ports work well, they pull in investment, spur manufacturing, and create jobs that ripple through entire regions. When they don't, everything from food imports to industrial supply chains feels the shock.

Over the last two decades, China has positioned itself at the centre of this system. The shift has been dramatic. In 2000, the United States was the top trading partner for more than 80 per cent of countries. Today, that number has fallen to around 30 percent. China now sits at the top of the trade ledger for more than 120 nations. It dominates commercial ties across Africa and South America; US–Africa trade, for instance, is now one-quarter the size of Africa's trade with China, according to the US Institute of Peace.

This rise is tightly linked to Beijing's global infrastructure push. When President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013-including its maritime wing, the Maritime Silk Road (MSR)-the intention was not a mystery: build a network of ports, shipping routes, and economic corridors that anchor global trade flows around China. The Indo-Pacific, where the majority of the world's container traffic already moves, became the immediate focus. Ten of the busiest container ports sit along the Pacific and Indian Ocean coasts. The Indian Ocean alone carries 80 percent of China's imported oil and around 95 percent of its trade with Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.

A port network that doubles as influence

Through the MSR, China now operates or has ownership stakes in 91 active port projects worldwide that could, at least in theory, support military activity. The PRC's State Council Information Office says the network spans 117 ports across 43 countries, mostly in the Global South. Each port is a commercial opportunity, but also a node in a far wider political and strategic map.

The consequences aren't abstract. In any large-scale conflict, the US military would rely on commercial shipping for as much as 90 percent of its cargo transport. Yet the US no longer has a cargo fleet sufficient for that task. In practice, it would have to depend on foreign-flagged vessels-many controlled or influenced by China. That imbalance alone shows how economic infrastructure can quietly shape national security.

Digital leverage: the LOGINK problem

China's footprint isn't limited to concrete and cranes. It extends deep into the digital layer of maritime logistics.

LOGINK, a Chinese state-backed logistics platform, has become embedded in major ports across Asia and Europe, including Japan and South Korea. On paper, it is a tool to track global cargo movements in real time. In practice, it gives Beijing a window into supply chains far beyond its borders: shipping patterns, inventory levels, cargo routes-details that, during a dispute, could be weaponised for commercial or geopolitical pressure.

US lawmakers have already taken the threat seriously. Congress has banned the Pentagon from using any port that relies on LOGINK. Commercial trade, however, has no such protection. Much of it continues to flow through systems where China either runs the platform or has influence over the data pipelines.

COSCO, one of China's state-owned shipping giants, has long participated in LOGINK and maintains data-sharing agreements with other state-linked entities such as the Shanghai International Port Group. Their access to granular shipping data may boost efficiency, but it also feeds strategic insights directly into Chinese state systems.

The undersea cables and“smart port” layer

This influence reaches beneath the waterline too. Huawei Marine-now restructured as HMN Technologies-has helped build more than a dozen submarine cable systems across Africa. These cables carry internet traffic and international communications; whoever builds or maintains them sits close to the data they move. Governments have raised concerns repeatedly about the potential for access or interception, which is why several countries have restricted Huawei in their telecom networks. The specific data terms for many African cable projects, however, remain opaque.

ZTE, another Chinese firm with strong state influence, has promoted“smart port” technology in several African ports. These systems integrate 5G networks, automation tools, cloud servers, and AI-based management platforms. While marketed as efficiency upgrades, they inevitably create new pathways for data consolidation-often routed through companies subject to Chinese domestic laws that compel cooperation with state agencies.

Analysts studying China's digital economy strategy say these port technologies are not just commercial offerings. They embed long-term dependence on Chinese digital infrastructure and could help Beijing tilt markets or gather intelligence in ways that are hard to detect.

Where the risks converge

With access to global cargo data, Chinese firms could forecast market trends before competitors do. Knowing when inventories build up or when supply chains tighten offers an advantage that private companies elsewhere simply do not have.

Port data can reveal movements of military cargo or pre-positioned equipment. In wartime, this could become a tool for tracking adversaries. The US ban on LOGINK-linked ports for military use reflects exactly this concern-and India faces a similar choice.

If China controls the digital platforms and physical infrastructure behind key trade routes, it can restrict access, delay shipments, or selectively apply pressure during diplomatic disputes. Several countries have already seen how swiftly Beijing can use trade as leverage.

China's increasing opacity in its territorial waters-where AIS (automatic identification system) signals often go dark-has made it easier for sanctioned entities and shadow fleets to operate undetected. The same pattern helps“research vessels” operating in the Indian Ocean, some of which have been suspected of seabed mapping and other dual-use intelligence activities.

How states can push back

Reducing China's control over global maritime data will take coordination rather than isolated action. Several steps are already being discussed internationally: Building independent maritime tracking platforms that do not rely on Chinese software. Creating coalitions for shared maritime data analysis and early-warning indicators. Investing in alternative digital infrastructure for ports, especially in the developing world. Increasing transparency requirements for shipping networks and port authorities. Imposing stricter reviews on any logistics system that handles defence-related movement

Some experts have also proposed a public dashboard that monitors Chinese activity across ports, undersea cables, and shipping lanes-similar to how satellite imagery has transformed global monitoring of military build-ups.

What is clear is that the global maritime system is slowly tilting toward a single data gatekeeper. And in an era where trade, logistics, and national security overlap more than ever, the country controlling the information layer of maritime commerce gains leverage that goes far beyond shipping lanes.

China has understood this early. The question now is how quickly the rest of the world catches up.

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