(MENAFN- The Rio Times) (Analysis) Ecuador is facing its gravest security crisis in a generation. Since January 2024, the government has treated the fight against drug cartels and allied gangs as an“internal armed conflict,” deploying the military alongside police and repeatedly renewing states of exception across crime-hit provinces.

The stakes rose in October with an attack on President Daniel Noboa's convoy amid weeks of protests triggered by diesel subsidy cuts. The question now is whether Noboa can survive-physically and politically-long enough to bend the curve of violence.

The numbers are stark. Ecuador registered 4,619 homicides in the first half of 2025-about 25.5 per 100,000 people-putting the country on pace for one of the highest annual rates in the Americas if trends do not reverse.

Three engines drive the bloodshed. First, cocaine logistics: cartels use Ecuador 's container ports to move product to Europe and North America, contaminating cargo at private terminals around Guayaquil and in Posorja.

By some recent law-enforcement tallies, roughly 30% of maritime container cocaine detected worldwide in 2023–2024 listed an Ecuadorian load port. Second, prisons: gang rivalries that began behind bars continue to incubate massacres and targeted killings.



Third, illegal mining: fast money from gold, especially along the northern frontier, has attracted armed groups and fueled deadly ambushes on security forces.

Noboa's answer has been to push harder. In 2025, Ecuador tightened criminal penalties, sped up asset seizures, and expanded legal protections for security forces.

Cooperation with the United States deepened as Washington labeled Los Choneros and Los Lobos as terrorist organizations and pledged fresh funding and equipment for counternarcotics and maritime surveillance.

Quito is also moving toward a constitutional change to allow foreign military bases, with a national vote scheduled for November 16.

Supporters see a necessary escalation; critics warn of overreach, rights abuses, and a strategy that risks provoking gangs faster than the state can degrade them.

The president also faces a legitimacy test at home. Fuel subsidy cuts and tax changes, including a VAT hike earlier in the year, have strained household budgets and mobilized Indigenous organizations and unions.

October's emergency decrees calmed some blockades but did not settle the underlying economic grievances. For now, Noboa retains a significant base of approval after winning a full term in April, but public patience will depend on results: fewer murders, safer ports, and visible gains in prison control.

What happens in Ecuador matters well beyond its borders-especially for Brazil and the wider region. Ecuador sits between Colombia and Peru, the world's largest cocaine producers, and its ports are key to Atlantic trade routes.

When criminal networks capture logistics hubs, exporters face higher insurance and security costs, and cross-border crime-from arms to environmental offenses linked to illegal mining-spills into neighbors.

Stabilization in Ecuador would mean cleaner supply chains, less extortion risk for shippers, and fewer opportunities for transnational gangs to expand.

The roadmap to get there is clear but difficult: sustained 100% scanning and tighter governance at high-risk terminals; professionalized prison management with vetted staff and isolation of gang leaders; targeted strikes on illegal mining networks paired with legal livelihoods in affected areas; and economic sequencing that cushions vulnerable groups while the state regains control.

Noboa's survival-of both his government and his broader project-hinges on turning these measures into a month-by-month decline in homicides and a measurable drop in contaminated containers. Without that, Ecuador's breaking point will become a new normal.

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