Russia Base Strike A Stark Warning For US Forces On Guam

In the Pacific, the US faces similar vulnerability. Kelly Grieco and other writers note in a December 2024 Stimson Center report that US forward airbases in the Asia-Pacific, once considered near-untouchable sanctuaries, are now within range of China's long-range bombers and missile arsenal.

If China were to consider a Pearl Harbor-like pre-emptive strike to neutralize US airpower on the ground to forestall intervention in a Taiwan conflict, it would most likely be through a multi-vector attack involving ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones launched from the Chinese mainland, dual-use infrastructure, warships and submarines, civilian vessels and embedded special forces teams.

In November 2022, the Chinese state mouthpiece Global Times reported that China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) unveiled a container-based missile launch system at the Airshow China in Zhuhai, showcasing a highly mobile and concealable weapon.

According to the report, the system integrates missile launchers, a power station and an operating station within a single container, requiring only four personnel for operation. It states that the system supports YJ-12E and YJ-18E supersonic anti-ship missiles, thereby enhancing coastal defense through rapid deployment and networked targeting.

In a 2021 article in International Law Studies, Raul Pedrozo notes that these systems could be hidden in shipping containers aboard civilian vessels, making them nearly impossible to detect.

Pedrozo points out that the missiles might be loaded with civilian logistics to evade detection and could be launched autonomously by utilizing targeting information from an external source.

In line with that, the UN Conference on Trade and Development's Handbook of Statistics 2023 says China owns nearly 6,000 Chinese-flagged vessels of 1,000 gross tonnage and above and another 2,800 registered under foreign flags – all of which are possible missile carriers.

Underscoring Guam's vulnerability, Domingo I-Kwei Yang mentions in an April 2025 Sinopsis report that China is quietly embedding its military potential across the Pacific through dual-use infrastructure projects, which pose a growing threat to Guam in particular.

Yang states that Chinese state-backed firms have established ports, airstrips, ICT nodes and fishery hubs in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and other locations, often funded by opaque loans under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

He mentions that these sites, many of which have surveillance, command and launch-enabling capabilities, extend the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) reach into Guam and Australia.

Further, Thomas Shugart III and Timothy Walton note in a January 2025 Hudson Institute report that Guam is acutely vulnerable to Chinese missile strikes due to a lack of hardened infrastructure at key US airfields in the region.

According to Shugart and Walton, China's PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) possesses hundreds of intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, where US bases remain largely unhardened.

They point out that, unlike China's extensive airfield fortifications, which include over 3,000 aircraft shelters and a robust airfield reconstitution capacity, US Pacific bases, such as those on Guam, lack hardened aircraft shelters, making aircraft and fuel stores susceptible to neutralization by as few as ten submunition-armed missiles.

Aside from those vulnerabilities, a May 2025 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report mentions that the development of the cornerstone AN/TPY-6 radar for Guam's missile defense system was halted by a January 2025 directive from the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

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The report notes that although the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) was ordered to halt full development, it was told to retain the fielded AN/TPY-6 panel as an experimental asset.

The GAO report also highlights that the absence of a clear US Department of Defense (DOD) strategy for transferring system responsibility for operations and sustainment significantly undermines the effectiveness of Guam's future missile defense.

While the report states that lead services have been designated for key elements-such as the Aegis Guam System, radars, interceptors and command centers-the DOD has no timeline or plan for when and how operational control and sustainment responsibilities will be transferred from MDA to the services.

The report notes this ambiguity stalls the development of training pipelines, personnel structures and maintenance regimes essential for long-term operational readiness, raising the possibility that Guam could receive cutting-edge missile defense hardware without the institutional backbone to keep it functional.

In short, Guam faces the worst of both worlds: a patchwork missile defense system and no clear plan for long-term sustainment. Like Russia's exposed bombers, the island risks becoming a sitting duck.

Unless the US urgently hardens its Pacific bastions and streamlines command, it could suffer a strategic surprise far more devastating than Ukraine's drone blitz-one engineered by China, cloaked in civilian vessels and launched from deep in the Pacific.

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