China In Africa: Footprint Maps Mislead While Real Risks Rise

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My study focuses mostly on East Africa, to include the Horn of Africa. Much of Beijing's engagement here remains primarily economic (as it does in west, central and southern Africa). However, China's growing control over critical infrastructure and digital networks, and its pursuit of military footholds near strategic maritime routes, present real security concerns.

Policymakers need to separate legitimate risks from exaggerated securitisation narratives. This would help them avoid the pitfalls of reactionary policies.

Negative consequences

Presenting China as a threat in Africa has three negative consequences.

First, it erodes the idea and reality of African sovereignty and agency. Maps portraying Africa as overrun by China suggest that governments and civil society are mere bystanders unable to negotiate their own foreign and domestic agendas.

The reality is that countries like Kenya actively engage with China to attract investments for development projects, and to balance their relations with other international actors like the US and Japan.

The result of securitisation is that American or Japanese policymakers, for instance, have begun to view Africa through the lens of their strategic competition with China. This is evident in Washington's foreign policy rhetoric, for example.

This increasingly frames African states not just as partners but also as strategic battlegrounds in the growing US-China rivalry. The risk is that African countries may start being treated as passive players.

Second, securitization inflates the perception of China as a global security threat.

The repeated use of maps with Chinese flags covering ports, railways and industrial zones creates an exaggerated image of unchecked expansion. These maps fail to show the host of other external states operating on the continent.

The US, multiple European states, Japan, India, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and South Korea all have significant interests in Africa. While China is by far the largest, most prominent external actor, with the widest reach throughout Africa, it's been singled out because of the perceived threats its presence in Africa may pose to the West.

Third, securitisation can lead to knee-jerk reactions to limit China's presence rather than engage constructively with Beijing's investments in Africa. These reactions can result in ill-advised attempts by China's competitors to push projects that don't correspond to the needs of African states.

This partly explains Ethiopia's strained relations with the west. Sanctions and aid cuts over the Tigray conflict fuelled a pivot toward China and Russia.

The security risks

Securitization raises valid concerns, but my research also underscores genuine security risks related to China's presence in Africa. These shouldn't be overlooked.

China's growing role and embeddedness in Africa's digital ecosystem presents a double-edged sword, for instance. Huawei and other Chinese companies have contributed to Africa's telecommunications and digital transformation .

But these investments also increase Beijing's potential influence over data security, cyber governance and information flows. These give China the option to exploit networks for surveillance, intelligence gathering or political coercion.

China's expanding control over dual-use infrastructure is another concern. Chinese-operated ports in Djibouti, for instance, can be used for commercial and military purposes.