Russia's New Nuke Doctrine - Tactical Use Risk Or Another Empty Threat?

Former President Dmitry Medvedev has also aired numerous threats, both vague and specific. Among the actions he has suggested could invite a nuclear response:

• any attack on Crimea , which Russia has illegally occupied since 2014
• provision of Western arms to Ukraine
• Finland and Sweden joining NATO
• a successful counteroffensive by Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine in 2023
• and strikes by Ukraine on Russian missile sites.

Last year, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov issued a similar nuclear warning about the Western supply of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine.

Some Putin associates have even raised the prospect of a nuclear attack against the United Kingdom, or as a warning blow against Ukrainian cities , to demonstrate Russia's seriousness against what it portrays as Western aggression.

These rhetorical blasts have also been accompanied by actions to signal Russia's seriousness, including holding drills involving its nuclear weapons or stationing tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.

Most of these Russian“red lines” have already been crossed, however, making Medvedev and the others look like the proverbial boy who cried wolf.

Ukraine's recent incursion into Russia's Kursk region, for example, crossed the line of undermining Russia's territorial integrity, although any Ukrainian advance is hardly likely to“threaten the existence” of the Russian state.

And while Moscow howls publicly that the incursion is a“provocation” or“escalation”, it has itself invaded and occupied nearly one-fifth of Ukraine's territory as recognized in a bilateral treaty , subjecting it to an occupation regime that is hard to describe other than as fascist .

In his interview, Ryabkov did not elaborate on what changes to the nuclear doctrine might be under consideration. He later told Russian television that NATO's“disregard for our potential in this area and a belief [...] that matters will not come to the worst requires a clearer and more precise statement of what can happen if they continue to ignore [our potential].”

This echoes the calls of one Russian foreign policy hawk to lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons to“sober up our opponents.”

An updated doctrine might also embrace the idea of“escalating-to-deescalate”, which has been advanced by some Russian military thinkers. The rationale here is that the first use of nuclear weapons could serve to“de-escalate” a conventional conflict on terms favorable to Russia.

Russian saber-rattling has certainly helped inject a high degree of caution into the West's response, slowing its supply of much-needed arms to Ukraine and restricting Ukrainian forces from using them inside Russia or against certain Russian targets. As The Economist points out, the reasons given by Washington for these restrictions keep shifting and remain unconvincing.

UK strategic expert Laurence Freedman notes that, by taking on a quasi-supervisory role in how weapons are used, the Americans are“caught in a trap of their own making” and seem unsure how to get out of it.

While Russian nuclear threats cannot be completely ignored, it seems unlikely the mooted changes will signal Russian actions any more clearly. The track record of saber-rattling bluster, muddied with regular disclaimers about having no intention to use nuclear weapons, comes across as a macabre“good cop, bad cop” routine.

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The idea Russia would use nuclear weapons against NATO countries merely for supplying Ukraine with arms seems preposterous. More plausible is a strike on Ukraine with tactical nuclear weapons if Russia is pushed out of its occupied territory in Ukraine. But this would surely have disastrous consequences for Russia internationally for marginal military gains.

If Russia does succeed in taking more Ukrainian territory or securing its present occupation, it will give other countries the message that nuclear weapons are the only way to protect themselves against nuclear powers. More nuclear saber-rattling only reinforces that message.

Ukraine itself handed the Soviet-era nuclear weapons it possessed to Russia in 1994 in exchange for guarantees of security and inviolability of borders, which have obviously proved meaningless.

Jon Richardson is visiting fellow at the Centre for European Studies, Australian National University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article .

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