India Drifting Away From Minimum Nuclear Deterrence

India's
new submarine base in the Bay of Bengal, known as Project Varsha, will enable it to implement a bastion strategy, with the Bay of Bengal's deep waters providing better cover for India's SSBNs compared to the Arabian Sea and allowing undetected SLBM launches, Asia Times noted in June 2024.

India's upcoming third aircraft carrier and escorts will safeguard the Bay of Bengal as part of its SSBN bastion strategy. The strategy will create a secure zone from which India can conceivably launch SLBMs unnoticed toward Chinese and Pakistani targets.

However, India's undersea nuclear deterrent may be handicapped by the short range of its SLBMs, including the K-15, and will arguably lack credibility vis-à-vis China until it fields SLBMs with intercontinental range.

Until then, India's SSBNs are limited to striking targets in southern Pakistan and would have to sail through the Malacca Strait to potentially hit targets in mainland China.

Asia Times noted in March 2024 that India's primary nuclear arsenal deficiency is its limited warhead yields. This limitation would not be overcome by merely increasing the number of low-yield warheads in its inventory.

India's nuclear capabilities are primarily geared toward power generation rather than nuclear weapons production, which is why its fissile material production is relatively slow despite its substantial nuclear infrastructure.

Yogesh Joshi points out in a March 2020 article for The Nonproliferation Review, a peer-reviewed journal, that the command and control of undersea nuclear weapons present several complex challenges for India, not least consistent communications with the surface.

He says this creates a dilemma where nuclear warheads must be pre-mated with missiles before patrols, effectively making the arsenal ready for use.

He points out that this situation complicates the“always-never” challenge of nuclear command, ensuring that authorized launches always happen while preventing unauthorized ones.

While India has developed procedural controls such as permissive action links (PAL) to mitigate risks, these mechanisms require extensive testing to ensure reliability during a crisis, Joshi says.

He notes that the effectiveness of these systems and the decision on whether to adopt a bastion strategy or continuous patrols remain significant issues as India seeks to secure a credible second-strike capability with its nascent SSBN fleet​.

Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda note in a July 2022 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that aircraft such as the Mirage 2000 and Jaguar serve as India's primary nuclear delivery platforms as they have been modified to carry nuclear weapons.

Kristensen and Korda mention that India's land-based missiles, including the Prithvi and Agni series, are stationed strategically to ensure a credible second-strike capability, covering regional and intercontinental threats.

They say cruise missiles like the Nirbhay are being developed to complement these capabilities, offering a versatile platform India can launch from land, air or sea.

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Kristensen and Korda say these platforms enhance India's nuclear deterrence by ensuring multiple delivery options. They note that India's multiple nuclear delivery systems complicate adversaries' strategic calculations and reinforce India's doctrine of credible minimum deterrence.

However, Zafar Khan argues in a November 2020 article in the peer-reviewed Comparative Strategy journal that India's commitment to that policy faces challenges as the nation advances its strategic capabilities.

Khan mentions that India's ambitious pursuit of deterrent force projects, such as the development of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) , suggests a shift away from its stated minimalistic nuclear approach.

He says these changes and India's growing strategic alliance with the US signify a broader transformation in its nuclear strategy, which is aimed at establishing a reliable deterrent against China and Pakistan, securing dominance in the region.

However, Khan notes these advancements create a paradox where India's evolving nuclear strategy may no longer align with its original minimum deterrence policy.

He argues that India's efforts to become a major global power could lead to regional instability, fuel an arms race with Pakistan and create new destabilizing complexities in South Asia's security dynamics while sparking uncertainties about India's supposed commitment to minimum nuclear deterrence.

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