Kim Jong Un's New Line More Bark Than Bite

It will be interesting, to say the least, to see how the amended constitution tries to square all these circles. The existing Supreme People's Assembly will probably be reconvened later this year, to amend the Constitution according to Kim's whims, before a new SPA is elected to approve whatever he comes up with next.

The new line also dictates practical tasks. Kim called for cross-border railways to be cut off, physically, completely, and“irretrievably.” Furthermore,“we should also completely remove the eye-sore 'Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification' [in] Pyongyang.” The monument
seems
to have come down promptly, with the railway and other work following some months later.

Kim's speech ended in a welter of militancy and contradictions. The DPRK's military buildup does not, he insisted, presage any“preemptive attack for realizing unilateral 'reunification by force of arms.'”

Ah, so this is purely for self-defense?

This second mission reserves the right to make a pre-emptive nuclear strike. In other words, Kim maintains the right to strike first if he feels threatened or provoked.

He concluded:

The pro forma protestation of not wanting to fight seems belied by the glee with which the prospect is savored.

What to make of all this? First, this whole turn should be seen primarily as an event in DPRK domestic politics, rather than inter-Korean relations.

It reflects Kim's frustration, shared by his predecessors, at the fact that South Korea exists: right there, on his doorstep and in his face, ever more successful and infinitely more prosperous. That is a profound challenge on many levels. Any North Korean government must find a way to account for and handle the South, in theory and practice alike.

Second, I suspect this is Kim's own idea. His visceral dislike for the ROK underlay an earlier episode: the razing of Southern-built facilities at the former Mount Kumgang tourist resort.

Kim's remarks at the time betrayed a seething anger at the very idea of South Korean property on Northern territory. He seemed to be against cooperation as such, not just annoyed at how this project had turned out.

Third, another reason to attribute this idea to Kim is the sheer incoherence noted above. What does he mean by“ROK”: Regime? Territory? People? He slips between all three, especially the first two. And if ROK is a separate state, on what basis is the DPRK entitled to subjugate it?

Put another way, this bears the hallmark of Kim Ki Nam's retirement. If the master molder of DPRK ideology and propaganda over many decades had still been on the case – he died aged 94 on May 7, having retired some years earlier – such a crass idea would surely never have been approved. For it solves no problems but creates a number of new ones.

Whatever Kim says, ordinary North Koreans know that South Koreans are in fact their kin, both in general and in particular. Highly publicized family reunions, whatever their inadequacies, are not a distant memory.

People will be puzzled, to say the least, at now being told otherwise. Moreover, this runs directly counter to the line decreed by previous Kims. Kim Jong Un's legitimacy rests largely on fidelity to his father and grandfather, so for him to openly defy this legacy must be risky.

We know what Kim now says but what will he do? At risk of sounding complacent, my bet is: Nothing much.

First, Kim's keenness to snuggle up to both Russia and China by no means creates a strong, united troika. Behind the formal bonhomie, both Xi and Putin are wary that this Kim might emulate his grandfather and drag them into costly and distracting conflict. China, in particular, which holds the purse strings, will not tolerate peninsular adventurism.

A second point: If Kim seriously intended to cause trouble at the Northern Limit Line, for instance, would he really give advance warning? Hamas did not go around shouting like this before October 7, nor warn that they planned to cut Israel's border fence.

A third reason is Kim's record. Readers may recall the politically tempestuous summer of 2020. Pyongyang frothed with talk of marching south, though this was not billed as a change of line. It all ended explosively, but no one was hurt when the North blew up the (by then unoccupied) former inter-Korean liaison office near Kaesong.

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None of this suggests a peninsula on the brink of war. Both sides are pushing the envelope, and the North's new doctrine is alarming if taken at face value – but that is the nub. Kim Jong Un faces a mountain of problems at home. Threatening to subjugate the South solves none of them but may – or may not – briefly distract his people from their hardships.

While vigilance remains essential, Kim's lurid new stance looks very like a new variation on a very old theme of fire-breathing performativity.

Aidan Foster-Carter (... )
is an honorary senior
research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds.

This article was first published by Pacific Forum and is republished with permission.