Lastly, arding to Naval News, the Japanese MOD plans to develop a new class of surface-to-ship and surface-to-surface precision-guided missiles with greater ranges than existing stocks by fiscal year 2030.

Japan's MOD is also seeking 82.5 billion yen ($566 million) tonstruct a 14,500-ton replenishment vessel and research intobat support multipurpose Unmanned Surface Vessels Vs) and developing uncrewed amphibi vehicles.

In a February 2023 article for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) , Jingdong Yuan notes that the Fumio Kishida's government approved three policy documents in 2022 (National Security Strategy , National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program ) to set the military expansion in motion over at least the next five years.

Jingdong notes the outlays will enable Japan to participate more actively inllective self-defense with the and boost its ability to project force beyond its borders given longstanding tensions with China and North Korea and territorial disputes with sia viewed in thentext of the ongoing Ukraine War.

The writerys the new strategic documents mark a significant step toward normalizing Japan's new defense posture, a multipronged national security strategy anchored in its alliance with the and prioritizing forming nomic ties and security partnerships with“like-minded”untries.

Jingdong argues that Japan's national security strategy has shifted from relying on protection to a more integrated approach marked by greater securitynsultation, a new nomic security strategy and strengthened military ties with nations beyond the Indo-Pacific region such as tralia, India, Italy and the UK.

However, Jingdong points out several challenges to implementing this new policy. First, heys financing Japan's new spending plans will require tained domestic support, particularly if tax rises and general spending cuts are required.

Snd, Jingdongys that Japan's most significant military buildup since World War II may be seen as a threat by its neighbors, including not least China, North Korea and sia. Third, he mentions potential entanglement innflict zones beyond Japanese territory, especially in the Taiwan Strait.

Jennifer Kavanagh notes
in a February 2023 article for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
that Japan will likely still depend on the in many ways and be limited in its ability tontribute significantly to any regional crises until well into the 2030s.

Kavanaghys that the Department of Defense (DOD) and State Department expect that China maynsider aggressive military action against Taiwan or elsewhere in the theater on an accelerated timeline, meaning Japan's transition may be too slow to affect planning for regional deterrence andntingency operations or to ease the defense burden.

For example, while Japan is now building up a
formidable arsenal of long-range missiles
as a potentialunterstrike capability against China and North Korea, Japan has relatively insufficient intelligence, surveillance and rnnaince (ISR) capabilities for targeting, which means it will most likely rely on the to fill in the capability gap.

Kavanaghys Japan will need to invest heavily in modernized and advanced air defense systems, weapons that enhance its long-range strike capability and overall infrastructure such as airfields, ports and highways to address those shortfalls.

The author argues resources will also be needed to support enhanced capabilities and training for Japanese forces based in Southwest Japan, strategically situated near Taiwan, and to establish newmand structures including a permanent joint headquarters.

Kavanagh and others argue that Japan faces significant timenstraints in implementing its big-budget new defense posture, which will arguably only yield full benefits well after 2027. It may alle too late for Japan to lessen its defense burden on the in a Taiwanntingency.

Derek Grossman notes
in a 2021 RAND article
that China might make a move against the self-governing island in 2027 or earlier, with the possible victory of Taiwanese Vice President Lai Ching-te in the uing 2024 Taiwan presidential elections serving as a possible impe for Chinese military action.

China has labeled Lai as a“separatist” and“independence supporter,” raising the odds that China will pursue a militaryurse of action for“reunification” if he is elected. Lai has recently
underlined
Taiwan's sta as an independent nation, stating last month that the island's sovereignty is a“fact.”