(MENAFN- Asia Times) After the Cold War ended, the South Caucasus, Caspian Sea basin, and Central Asia became areas of practical policy focus for Western geopolitical strategists, who recognized their importance for international affairs going beyond the region's rich energy resources. However, a hiatus of this strategic engagement set in at the end of the first decade of the new century.
Now, a decade and a half later, interest from the US State Department and policymakers and advisers in Washington has been rekindled, accompanied by a new European outreach that has so far been moderate.
Against the backdrop of intensifying diplomatic and economic exchanges between China and the five Central Asian countries, as exemplified by the recent high-profile summit in Xian, the significance of the Middle Corridor stretching across the Caspian Sea has in recent years steadily grown.
Less noticed was the second EU–Central Asia Economic Forum, which was held in Almaty at the same time as the meeting in Xian. The European Union has thus signa led its recognition of the Middle Corridor as a possible counterbalance to reliance on Russian-dominated infrastructure.
The Almaty meeting is an indicator of the EU's strategic policy direction, adopted by the Council of the European Union in June 2019, seeking to cultivate closer ties with Central Asian nations.
This strategic policy focuses on resilience, including border security and the environment; on prosperity, especially“sustainable connectivity”; and on the promotion of regional cooperation.
Role of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan
This emerging focus from the West intersects with the strategic vision advocated by two key nations, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. That is because these states, pivotal to the implementation of the Middle Corridor, have endeavored to foster the autonomous development of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Azerbaijan in particular has been instrumental, given its geographical nexus bridging Europe and Asia, and its status as a critical transport and logistical fulcrum within the Middle Corridor structure.
The principal catalyst for the operational launch of the Middle Corridor has been the two countries' active bilateral cooperation since 2017. This bilateral cooperation has since been reframed into a plurilateral platform to foster regional development, contributing to the transformation of the geo-economic landscape. The Middle Corridor has evolved from a geo-economic blueprint to a politically significant transit route.
Transformations of international trade patterns following Russia's re-invigoration of its war against Ukraine have underscored the importance of the Middle Corridor. Evidence of its rising significance is visible in quantitative terms, with freight volume along the Middle Corridor experiencing a twofold increase in the past year alone, even this remains relatively low in absolute terms.
China's aspirations
The prevailing narrative that depicts the Middle Corridor as a component of China's Belt and Road Initiative misconceives Beijing's view and neglects its own distinct strategic dimension. In reality, China's commitment to the Middle Corridor pales in comparison to the resources it has directed to other transit routes (the northern route through Russia and the southern maritime route) integral to the BRI.
The continued advancement of the Middle Corridor, despite obstacles, is actually emblematic of the broader South Caucasus–Central Asia region's aspiration to political and economic autonomy.
Despite laudable strides in developing critical infrastructure, such as Azerbaijan's creation of the modern multimodal Port of Alat, the Western powers' recognition of this route's strategic significance has not yet translated into proportionate support for its extension. For that, deeper strategic commitment by the Western powers would be required, accompanied by increased multilateral investment.
If the Middle Corridor is developed in good time, it will hold the potential to serve as a conduit for Central Asia's emancipation from Russia's influence, as this continues to decline in the wake of its war in Ukraine.
Russia's historical propensity to exert pressure on Central Asian countries through military threats and its control over energy markets could explain China's reticence over the Middle Corridor. At the Xian summit, for example, Beijing touted a long-planned route through Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan, whence theoretically onward through northern Iran and Turkey to Europe.
Even though the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR) – a broader-scope project of which the Middle Corridor is the most important segment – was initially considered as an alternative route for Chinese and potentially Southeast Asian goods to reach Europe, Beijing seems never really to have considered it as part of the BRI in practice.
In particular, Chinese investment in the TITR, and especially in the Middle Corridor, has lagged. That is because China envisages the Middle Corridor mainly as a conduit for expanding its own influence in Central Asia.
It hesitates to extend support that might lead to any challenge to its own standing in the geopolitical equilibrium. It seeks to tilt in the region in its own direction by other means.
Changed circumstances driving new possibilities now give the TITR and the Middle Corridor the real potential to drive autonomous economic development and integration in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. This would be particularly true for the South Caucasus, if Armenia seizes the current opportunity for a comprehensive peace treaty with Azerbaijan.
Western interests
Strategic steps by the West can enhance trade flows through the Middle Corridor. These increased flows could guarantee a reliable supply of essential raw materials to the EU, meanwhile encouraging regional economic development and integration.
The ultimate result would be to drive the reconfiguration of the region's economic geography in advance of the oncoming breakup and collapse of the current international system, which is foreseeable in the early/mid-2040s.
In this longer-term perspective, the Middle Corridor – arguably the backbone of the TITR – has the potential to establish the broader region, from the South Caucasus through Central Asia, as a relatively autonomous actor in world politics, that is, one that is not just the object of great-power whims but which can create its own circumstances.
Not only would such a development catalyze the fuller geo-economic transformation of the broader region – South Caucasus, Caspian Sea region, and Central Asia – but also it would, ultimately, influence the reconfiguration of the global balance of power already under way.
That reconfiguration would diminish the encroaching hegemony of the New Triple Alliance of China, Iran and Russia. It would therefore be in the interest of Europe, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Indo-Pacific countries.
It follows that the Indo-Pacific nations should make greater efforts in support of the TITR and, in the first instance, of the Middle Corridor.
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