(MENAFN- AzerNews)
Orkhan Amashov read more By Orkhan Amashov
What the year 2023 has in store for the next phase of the
tug-of-war involving Azerbaijan and Armenia, for all its general
uncertainty, orbits around one probable pattern: in the face of
Yerevan's continuous disinclination to fulfil the provisions of the
10 November 2020 declaration and unwillingness to sign a peace
treaty, Baku will narrow the negotiable agenda items by
irreversibly changing the facts on the ground, gradually
entrenching its means of influence, both within the zone under
Russian temporary control, and enhancing its military positions
along the currently undelimited interstate border.
The press conferences of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, both held on 10 January,
provided a fairly elucidating glimpse into the official lines to
which the sides will adhere in their further dialogue. In Baku's
view, Yerevan's insistence on the inclusion of the Karabakh theme
in the text of a peace treaty is a major stumbling block. Armenia
is conscious of the inevitability of recognising Azerbaijani
territorial integrity, including this region, but it hopes to
incorporate some form of a fluid formula, theoretically keeping
alive 'secessionist” ambitions.
Pashinyan's task regarding this critical point remains within
the pre-existing parameters. During the 10 January press
conference, he said:“The international community perceives
Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan and we may not have been pragmatic
when we thought the four UN Security council resolutions were
simply written texts we could ignore”. And then he added that, in
this light, Armenia“has the choice to follow the logic of
international developments or go against this logic”.
This may superficially sound groundbreaking but, in fact, it is
not, for similar confessions have been made before, with belated
corrections and additional nuances corrupting their original
meaning. By following such a gloomy line, Pashinyan seems to
explain to Armenian society that it is inevitable that Azerbaijani
sovereignty over Karabakh must be recognised by Yerevan, stressing
that it is not his fault, but due to the failures of his
predecessors.
Simultaneously, his message to Baku could be construed as one
suggesting there is a limit as to how far Yerevan could acquiesce
with Azerbaijani demands, with treaty-based guarantees for the
Armenian population of Karabakh being a necessary condition. The
likely probability is that Pashinyan will continue to argue within
the self-same parameters, incrementally ditching his reservations
in a semi-surreptitious manner. Doing so, before Azerbaijani
positions are entrenched in the zone of the Russian ́peacekeeping'
contingent, would make a great deal of sense for him. However,
cold, hard reason is an unaffordable luxury for him at the
moment.
The situation over the Lachin Road, Armenia's disgruntlement
with perceived Russian inaction and anti-Kremlin protests in Gyumri
have considerably deteriorated Yerevan-Moscow relations, with some
suggesting that the government of Pashinyan may take steps to leave
the Kremlin-led organisations, namely the Collective Security
Treaty Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Alliance. In reality,
the situation is not as on such a knife-edge as may be
superficially apparent. Even those who believe such future moves to
be necessary still consider these to be currently unwise.
President Aliyev has also clarified that the Russian ́peacekeeping' contingent has manifestly failed to fulfil its
duties, resulting in the misuse of the Lachin Road. The road's
regime might have been agreed on a trilateral basis via the 10
November 2020 declaration, but its real future is likely to be the
subject of the negotiations between Baku and Moscow, which
manifested itself earlier, during the construction and completion
of the new route, in relation to which Armenia had negligible
leverage.
The net effect of the decrease in the Kremlin's influence in the
region has had its share of impact on the Moscow-Baku-Yerevan
triangle, with its various internal ad hoc alliances being reshaped
in a way that gradually increases Baku's prospects and diminishes
Yerevan's maneuverability.
Azerbaijan's determination to make the Zangazur Corridor project
a reality remains steadfast and augmented, with Yerevan's
resistance gradually losing its trenchant propensities. With work
within its jurisdiction in full swing, Baku will continue to
capitalise on the cumulative force emanating from the geopolitical
equilibrium favouring its interests to make Armenia come to terms
with the necessity of providing a two-way communications route
between Nakhichevan and the rest of Azerbaijan.
With Russia's influence in the region gradually receding, both
Baku and Yerevan are displaying a degree of assertiveness, for the
former being a mode of behaviour of practical import, with the
latter being circumscribed to rhetoric and unsubstantiated
warnings. The two briefings held on 10 January reflected two
contrasting narratives, albeit not completely devoid of elements
pointing to possible commonalities. As Neil Watson, British
Journalist, commented:“The gradual closing of the zoo door on the
Russian bear is enabling both Armenia and Azerbaijan to reduce the
impact of their mutual past colonial oppressor, and that can only
be good for measured constructive dialogue.”
There is also a discernible thread exemplifying the pattern that
is likely to be central to future Baku-Yerevan dynamics: progress
is likely to be achieved not through perfectly constructive
diplomatic dialogue, but via a complex array of tug-of-war chess
moves, with Azerbaijan's coercive assertiveness gradually forcing
Armenia's hand and compelling it to reluctant acquiescence.
---