Global Shipping Order May Never Recover From Hormuz

Rather than reacting to crises, Washington's approach to the Strait of Hormuz reflects an effort to anticipate and exploit disruption, shaped by a series of tests to its maritime order in recent years.

Since 2023, Houthi rebel drone and missile attacks on shipping in the Red Sea have kept tanker traffic below pre-crisis levels, even after US-led military intervention and a 2025 ceasefire. That agreement now appears fragile amid Houthi threats to resume attacks and Iran's push to them“to prepare for a renewed campaign against Red Sea shipping if the US escalates its military actions against Iran, according to European officials,” stated to Bloomberg News.

Simultaneously with the Houthis' Red Sea campaign, nearby Somali piracy has also rebounded. Driven in part by foreign fishing and toxic waste dumping in Somali waters­, piracy grew rapidly off the country's coast in the late 2000s and early 2010s before a sustained international effort led by the US, NATO, and the EU brought it under control. Its resurgence is indicative of the weakening of international maritime security cooperation and the limits of US enforcement capacity.

There has also been a state-to-state maritime disruption before the Hormuz crisis. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, war efforts have significantly reduced Black Sea traffic and undermined internationally-brokered agreements, turning much of it into a“no-man's land.” Russian access to the Black Sea and the Danish straits has also been restricted by Western enforcement measures.

However, the global Western enforcement architecture that has helped support American maritime dominance for decades is itself coming under strain amid tensions within the transatlantic alliance.

The Trump administration's renewed interest in Greenland, in particular, has raised tensions with Denmark and other EU members, exposing cracks in Western unity that complicate collective action at sea even before the current crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.

The Trump administration's focus on expanding US power in the Americas also entails countering China's extensive global trade influence, seen most visibly in the current competition over the Panama Canal.

Built between 1903 and 1914, the US began gradually transferring control of the canal to Panama during the 1970s. The US, however, invaded Panama in 1989 in part to secure the canal and to depose Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. Full control was transferred to Panama in 1999, by which time Hong Kong-based CK Hutchinson had already secured concessions to operate major container terminals on both the Atlantic and Pacific sides.

At the Panama Canal and elsewhere,“by securing ownership stakes and operational leases in port infrastructure, Chinese firms can streamline global operations and grow their influence over supply chains while providing greater market access and reduced shipping costs for other Chinese companies,” according to the Jamestown Foundation. Formal and informal advantages in scheduling and berths add to these gains, giving China an edge on major shipping routes.

Panama now faces renewed US pressure to reassert influence and limit China's role. In early 2026, Panama's Supreme Court ruled that aspects of the agreement with CK Hutchinson were unconstitutional, triggering a state review and plans to rebid operating rights. A consortium of American companies led by BlackRock is now positioned to gain this critical logistics hub, drawing heavy criticism from Beijing.

“The canal is a critical component of global infrastructure, facilitating the transit of more than 5-6% of the world's maritime trade.... the agreement with BlackRock, granting the American financial consortium access to port infrastructure, was a pivotal point in Panama's strategic reorientation. This move not only curtailed China's economic maneuvering space but also prompted a reconsideration of the control architecture over supply chains in the Central American region,” stated an article in the Transatlantic Dialogue Center.

The saga appears to be a costly but partial win, reflecting the Trump administration's efforts to counter China's global port network. Several Trump administration officials have also singled out China's involvement in Peru's Chancay port, while US Ambassador to Greece Kimberly Guilfoyle suggested that China sell its control over Greece's Piraeus port, a major gateway into Europe. The Biden administration likewise backed efforts to offset China's reach, including a $553 million agreement with Sri Lanka in 2023 to compete with Chinese trade infrastructure there.

That deal ultimately fell through in 2024, highlighting Washington's difficulty in sustaining even limited foreign port developments. From 2000 to 2025, China directed $24 billion into 168 ports across 90 countries, building out logistics and networks and integrating them with a rapidly growing fleet that far exceeds that of the US.

Over time, the US Navy's role in securing global shipping lanes for its own economic interests has also protected China's trade, allowing Beijing to expand its global network without bearing the cost of keeping those routes open.

However, as the US Naval Institute has openly noted,“China's dependence on extended overseas supply lines makes it politically and economically vulnerable. This is a critical vulnerability that, in the event of conflict, could be targeted. And US Marines could help.”

Despite the expansion of overland trade routes, most Chinese commerce still moves by sea. Changes to the status quo at chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and Panama Canal, therefore, carry major security implications, as even China's large and rapidly expanding navy lacks the global force projection and operational experience to reliably secure its maritime trade network.

China's exposure is shared by most countries, including close European and other U.S.-allied economies. On April 1, the Financial Times reported that Trump threatened to halt weapons shipments to Ukraine until European countries sent forces to open the Strait of Hormuz.