What's The Likelihood Of A NATO-Russia Non-Aggression Pact?

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The greater the scale of the United States'“pivot” back to East Asia, especially if it leads to the redeployment of some forces from Europe, the less likely it will be that NATO's European members (except the UK) saber-rattle against Russia, since they'd doubt that the US would rush to their aid if they provoked a conflict.

Their newfound sense of relative vulnerability, which is derived from their pathological intertwined hatred and fear of Russia, could then soften them up to a US-mediated NATO-Russian pact that they otherwise would not agree to.

Just as the US will struggle to get the Europeans to abide by Putin's demand they stop arming Ukraine, so, too, might Washington struggle to get them to abide by whatever it proposes with respect to the new security architecture in Europe that it envisages jointly creating with Russia after the Ukrainian conflict ends.

Nevertheless, the United States' presumably reduced military presence in central and eastern Europe by that point could facilitate agreements on the status of NATO forces in the Arctic-Baltic, central and eastern Europe and the Black Sea-South Caucasus.

The Jozef Pulsudski monument in Turek, Poland. Photo:

This vast region not coincidentally overlaps with the“cordon sanitaire” that interwar Polish leader Jozef Pilsudski wanted to create via the complementary policies of the“Intermarium” (a Polish-led security-centric regional integration bloc) and“Prometheism” (Balkanizing the USSR) – but ultimately failed to achieve. In today's context, US support for the revival of Poland's long-lost great power status could see Poland leading Russia's containment there on the United States' behalf but within strictly agreed-upon confines.

Russia-NATO tensions can still be managed so long as the risk of war in central and eastern Europe is reduced, which can be achieved by placing limits upon Poland's militarization and hosting of foreign forces in exchange for Russia's withdrawing some or all of its tactical nukes and Oreshniks from Belarus.