China hails the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor as“clean” development, with Gwadar showcased as the flagship gateway. But the waters around Balochistan sit astride the Indian Ocean's“southern route”, a long-running sea corridor for Afghan heroin and increasingly, methamphetamine. UN studies describe how traffickers load drugs on small dhows along Pakistan and Iran's Makran coast, then run consignments onward to the Gulf, India and East Africa. They sometimes transfer at sea, masking loads in legitimate shipping. Recent analysis by European and UN bodies adds that some traffickers now exploit containerised routes alongside traditional dhow traffic.

Recent Interdictions Highlight Maritime Threats

This maritime backdrop has turned acute this autumn. It was reported on 9 October 2025, that a Pakistan Navy frigate PNS Yamama, operating with the Saudi-led Combined Maritime Forces (CTF-150) in September, intercepted a stateless dhow in the Arabian Sea and seized methamphetamine and cocaine. Less than two weeks later, another CTF-150 operation with the Pakistan Navy netted over two tonnes of crystal meth, with the task force saying the 48-hour haul approached a million dollars at street prices. Though neither interdiction proves that drugs moved through Gwadar's quays, they underline the scale and proximity of the trade to Pakistan's southern coastline.

Chinese Control and Gwadar's Operating Model

On shore, Gwadar's governance and operating model create openings that smugglers can test. China Overseas Ports Holding Company (COPHC) holds a long concession to operate the port and the adjoining free zone. Official and corporate records date the handover to COPHC to 2013, with a 40-year horizon. In practice, that means a Chinese state-linked operator runs the terminal and the free-zone estate, while the Gwadar Port Authority remains the public landlord. The arrangement is legal and long-standing, but it concentrates operational control and, critically for customs, puts a premium on rapid, paperwork-driven clearances that free-zone sites often promise.

Customs Oversight: Rules vs. Reality

Pakistan Customs has, on paper, upgraded its risk-management tools. Federal Board of Revenue notices and training material describe non-intrusive inspection (NII) and e-manifests, with scanners intended to speed flows while flagging risk. Yet much of the scanner investment documented by government and media has landed first at Karachi Port and Port Qasim, the country's busy legacy gateways. That leaves a familiar vulnerability at quieter ports-- when cargo volumes are low and risk engines lean on documentation, irregular manifests and mis-declarations can slide through unless random checks and scan coverage are robust.

Low Traffic, Weak Deterrence, and Governance Gaps

Two further strands deepen concern. First, even sympathetic commentaries concede Gwadar has seen limited commercial traffic since COPHC took over. Analytical pieces have contrasted the port's strategic promise with its thin ship calls, a mismatch that can weaken day-to-day deterrence because there are fewer eyes-public and private-on each box. Despite hopes for growth, Gwadar currently handles much less cargo than Karachi or Port Qasim, which is key for customs oversight. Second, groups monitoring governance in Pakistan have raised flags about the institutions around the port. In February 2025, Transparency International Pakistan published a letter alleging violations of national procurement rules in a Gwadar Port Authority tender, a small but telling sign of weak controls inside a key public counterpart to the operator. Separately, Pakistan's broader corruption indicators remain poor. They suggest a challenging environment for clean contracting and diligent enforcement.

Local Protests and Security Distractions

Local voices add pressure. Since mid-2024, Baloch community activists have staged rolling protests in Gwadar and across Balochistan, accusing authorities of secrecy, heavy-handed policing and inequitable benefits from Chinese-backed projects. Reporting by international and regional outlets has documented sit-ins, clashes and shutdowns led by the Baloch Yakjehti Committee. While the protests are primarily about rights and representation, activists and local journalists also complain about opaque logistics and lax checks-conditions that can be exploited by smugglers when security tensions distract the state.

Potential Smuggling Risks Through Chinese-Linked Logistics

None of this establishes that Chinese shipping firms are directing narcotics flows. But it does show how Chinese-linked logistics can intersect with permissive systems. If a freight forwarder using a Chinese line's boxes files a vague or irregular manifest and a low-traffic port relies mainly on documents rather than physical inspection, the gap between rules and reality becomes a smuggler's opportunity. Pakistan's evolving customs rule-set for Gwadar's free zone, including a January 2025 statutory order naming the Collector of Customs for the port and zone, clarifies authority but does not guarantee capacity. In environments like this, effective oversight depends less on the existence of rules than on how often containers are scanned, seals are verified, and suspicious consignments are opened steps could tighten the system without choking legitimate trade. Publishing monthly statistics on scanner coverage and physical examinations at Gwadar would build confidence and let the public judge whether risk-based controls are working NII equipment and trained staff at Gwadar to the levels already documented at Karachi and Port Qasim would reduce reliance on paperwork. And linking port-gate data to maritime domain awareness-so that unusual dhow traffic off the Makran coast automatically raises scrutiny of same-day gate moves-would help align land-side checks with the very real sea-borne threat that CTF-150 and the Pakistan Navy have highlighted this season.

The Stakes for Beijing and Islamabad

For Beijing, there is a reputational stake. The more Gwadar's customs regime is seen as porous, the harder it is to square China's messaging about“clean” growth with the meth-heavy reality in surrounding waters. For Islamabad, the calculation is practical-- closing inspection gaps at a strategic but still-quiet port is cheaper than fighting an entrenched narco-economy later. Until both sides show their work with transparent data and tougher, smarter checks, suspicion will cling to the containers leaving and entering Gwadar-especially those tied to Chinese-linked vessels.

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