Taiwan's Future Precarious-With Or Without US-China Conflict

Most recently, in late July, recall votes were held where citizens in 24 districts of Taiwan chose whether or not to remove their legislator from office. This is the result of a law in Taiwan stipulating a new vote if 10% of the electorate in a specific constituency express dissatisfaction at the previous outcome. Activists supporting the government mobilised to achieve this.

The votes seem to be associated with frustration that, while the Democratic Progressive party controls the presidency, it cannot get legislation through a parliament dominated by its opponents.

All of the votes were directed at seats held by the Kuomintang, the main opposition party in recent years, which is accused by its critics of being pro-China. Not a single seat was overturned.

When the steady nationalism of Xi Jinping's leadership in Beijing is factored in, with its conviction that the global influence of the West is slowly declining and the East – dominated by China – is in the nascent, one can see why the issue of Taiwan might look more precarious and worrying.

This is regardless of the various predictions that 2027 is the date that China has set to go for reunification.

For the US, President Donald Trump's fixation has remained on correcting what he sees as China's unfair trade advantages with its largest single economic partner – something he has long talked about .

The White House proclaimed in March, when the first set of trade negotiations with China concluded after tariffs were imposed by both sides, that :“for too long, unfair trade practices and America's massive trade deficit with China have fuelled the offshoring of American jobs and the decline of our manufacturing sector.”

The aim at the most recent set of talks in Stockholm, Sweden, in late July was to drive towards a new deal. Trump has also reportedly talked of taking a huge delegation of business people to China at some point later in 2025. This is despite the fact that so far since his inauguration in January, and despite many reasons to talk, Xi and Trump have yet to physically meet.

Taiwanese people are therefore right to feel increasingly uneasy. Under Trump's predecessor, Joe Biden, they received verbal commitments that the US would come to Taiwan's aid if it was attacked. This was not formal US policy, which has long maintained an ambiguous stance on Taiwan.

Ambiguity has returned with a vengeance under Trump. His secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, has said that the US stands by Taiwan. But these days in Washington all roads lead to the Oval Office, and Trump's stance is far harder to predict.

If China were to dangle a trade deal in front of the US president – committing to buy more US goods, put in more investment that is non-problematic on security grounds in the US and generally abide by American demands – would Trump be able to resist?

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It could be presented as a historic achievement, a new concordant between the world's two greatest powers who had seemed until then set on conflict and clash. There might even be the much-desired Nobel Peace Prize in it for the US leader.

Trump, for his part, appears increasingly reluctant to back Taiwan in ways that risk provoking Beijing. Lai delayed a trip to Latin America in July after the Trump administration reportedly told him to cancel a proposed stopover in New York. And the US cancelled a meeting with Taiwan's defense minister one month earlier.

The likelihood remains that, if a real crisis occurs, then the US will climb down from the middle wall and do something to defend Taiwan.

Any trade deal between Beijing and Washington will also probably be a highly circumscribed one. China is not an easy partner to negotiate with, and it is unlikely to offer Trump the kind of capitulation he is seeking.

Even so, these are very unpredictable times. The key calculation going forward will be the simple one of what the US gains and loses from all its relationships – and that includes Taiwan .

Kerry Brown is professor of Chinese Politics and director of the Lau China Institute, King's College London

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article .

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