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However, Anil Chopra notes in a July 2022 article for the Center of Air Power Studies (CAPS) that WIG aircraft face notable limitations, including maneuverability constraints in congested environments, susceptibility to obstacle interference and vulnerability under severe weather conditions.

Chopra adds that while advantageous in low-altitude flight for radar evasion, their reliance on stable sea states – especially during amphibious operations – may impair mission continuity. He further explains that despite improved endurance and payload over vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) systems, WIG platforms require extensive infrastructure, such as large hangars, and offer limited altitude flexibility for tactical repositioning.

Chopra notes that adverse conditions may necessitate a diversion to higher altitudes, which reduces stealth benefits. He also highlights that radar detection remains feasible at ultra-low altitudes, potentially compromising survivability against integrated air defenses.

Production viability may also be in question. As Justin Katz observes in a November 2022 article for Breaking Defense, the Soviet Union built several WIG craft, such as the Lun-class , but failed to produce a design viable for mass production. The implication for China is that despite technological advances, moving from prototype to fleet-scale deployment remains a formidable challenge.

At the operational level, China's WIG craft may play critical roles in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and possibly beyond the First Island Chain.

The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported in April 2023 that a WIG based in Hainan could reach any point in the disputed South China Sea within four hours and transport passengers or cargo between Chinese-controlled islands in the region. SCMP notes that WIGs could be critical assets for a fast transport network between China and its occupied islands in the South China Sea.

In a Taiwan Strait conflict, H.I. Sutton notes in a June 2025 Naval News article , China's new WIG would be particularly suited for amphibious landing operations. The author points out that some Soviet designs were intended to deliver troops and armored vehicles directly onto enemy beaches. Supporting this notion, Walker Mills and other writers in a September 2020 Proceedings article describe how a fleet of 10 Soviet Lun-class WIGs could cross the Baltic Sea with minimal radar signature in just 12 minutes and land 5,000 troops without warning.

However, the Taiwan Strait presents environmental challenges that could limit WIG use during an invasion. In a November 2024 report for the US Naval War College, Andrew Erickson and other authors note that China faces numerous obstacles in executing an amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait.

They point out that the strait's 130-kilometer-wide waters are prone to rough sea states, limiting viable landing days to about 10 per month during favorable seasons. They add that the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) amphibious sealift capability is insufficient to sustain a large-scale, multi-wave landing force.

Moreover, they state that Taiwan's coastal topography – characterized by cliffs, narrow beaches and urban sprawl – further constrains viable landing zones. They also mention that Taiwan's precision strike capabilities, layered coastal defenses and early warning systems would likely disrupt cross-strait logistics and troop buildup.

Beyond transport roles, China may consider constructing a combat variant of its WIG. Michael Knickerbocker notes in a March 2022 article for the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) that wing-in-ground maritime attack craft (WMACs) offer disruptive tactical advantages by exploiting radar limitations with low-elevation, sea-skimming profiles and unpredictable flight patterns.