US Lethality Not Enough To Counter China's Malign Influence

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It must be stressed, again, that those“wins” for Washington were the product of PRC actions taken in defense of what Beijing considers core interests – whether concerning territorial rights , defense of the Chinese mainland or the credibility of Communist Party rule – and had little to do with US messaging or improvements to the American reputation in the region.

And political successes in these countries may not be as durable as they appear. Taiwan's pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party recently launched a sweeping set of measures designed to counter PRC influence, but its pro-unification opposition still finds much success in local elections and now holds the majority in the Legislative Yuan, where it has used that majority to fight the defense budget increases the Trump administration wants to see , and even civil defense-bolstering programs .

The current leadership of the Philippines has been strident in its support for the US alliance and has done the most among ASEAN nations to shine a light on the PRC's coercive tactics in the South China Sea.

Yet the former president, who enjoyed a much friendlier relationship with China, remains a popular figure despite his recent arrest by the International Criminal Court. Duterte's party did very well in recent Senate elections, increasing the chances that his daughter, the current vice president, will survive upcoming impeachment proceedings and run for president herself in 2028.

South Korea, after three years of close cooperation with the United States and Japan, just elected a candidate much more open to cooperation with China.

Even Japan, where the success of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party is rarely in doubt, currently labors through a period of weak governance that makes the formulation of effective defense policy difficult, especially in terms of overcoming its post-war pacifism and insularity and preparing for an operation as risky as the defense of Taiwan .

If the United States is to remain engaged in the Indo-Pacific and prevent PRC domination, it faces obstacles that cannot be solved by lethality alone. The PRC currently wages a campaign that lethality cannot counter.

As Xi Jinping continues to purge high-ranking officers , the PRC would seem to lack the capability to direct an invasion even if it has the manpower and equipment to wage one. Therefore, its assaults on these locations will remain more subtle. These will include:

• seeking to co-opt the target countries' politicians, academics, media and social media personalities with paid trips to China,
• directing and controlling diaspora communities through the presence of overseas“police stations” that some countries are not legally equipped to counteract,
• buying up crucial assets and establishing partnerships to ensure deference from business communities, and
• spreading narratives through official and unofficial channels that the United States is unreliable, untrustworthy and unable to counter the inevitability of China's rise.

If the United States is not engaged in countering such influence, in the next five years Taiwan could again have a pro-unification leadership – or, at least, gridlock could prevent it from adequately prepping its defenses – while Manila could turn against hosting US military bases, Seoul could vow neutrality in a Taiwan contingency and Tokyo might not have made any meaningful preparations to counter PRC ambitions in the region.

Under such circumstances, even if the defense secretary does get the most lethal US military in history, the US armed forces may be rendered helpless by politics in partner countries.

The recent departure of Elon Musk, the Department of Government Efficiency's founder, from the US government is an opportunity to begin rebuilding soft power organs – USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy and the Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labor at the State Department – that were targeted by spending cuts.

The Defense Department should be part of broader, whole-of-government efforts – including State, Commerce, Energy, Treasury and others – not just to counter the PRC, but also to erode its influence. The lethality of US forces should not merely be enhanced; partners should know the United States will use it to good ends, including their defense against unprovoked aggression.

The Trump administration need not worry about empowering political leaders who do not share its vision – political parties of the right are leading the charge against Chinese influence in Manila, Seoul, Tokyo and elsewhere and, despite its name, Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party is a big tent more committed to Taipei's autonomy than to political progressivism.

Nor should such moves be seen as interference in the domestic affairs of partners; Washington has worked with unlikely partners in countries where politicians have campaigned on skepticism of the United States – until they, and the constituencies that elected them, saw what the alternative to the United States was.

But before the United States can convince these countries that they should arm themselves, Washington must first convince regional countries that there is a threat to prepare for and that the United States is the reliable partner it claims to be.

A trillion dollars in lethal weapons systems, by itself, will not buy that.