China's Taking Cues From Russia To Undermine US Security Umbrella

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For a long time, there were also major differences between the Chinese and Russian approaches. Many of these differences, however, have either diminished, or no longer apply today because the Chinese approach has come to resemble the Russian approach, at least in three ways.

First, traditionally Beijing has seen US extended deterrence as an effort to prevent China's rise and rightful return as the Middle Kingdom – whereas, to Moscow, it is a vicious attempt to crush Russia.

For example, Wei Fenghe, China's former minister of national defense, said a few years ago that the United States wants to“create conflict and confrontation, and to contain and encircle others.” By contrast, Russia's President Vladimir Putin stated last year that“the United States ... has shifted the military aspect of NATO back into the spotlight, collectively declaring their intention to inflict a strategic defeat upon us.”

So, while Beijing has seen US extended deterrence as an encirclement or containment problem, Moscow has viewed it as existential.

That is changing, however. Like Moscow, Beijing today is increasingly looking at US extended deterrence in existential terms, for two reasons. One is because the United States has labeled China its number one competitor and, recently, influential US voices have insisted that Washington should“win” the competition against Beijing and defeat the Chinese Communist Party. To Chinese, that means the United States wants regime change in China.

The other reason Chinese officials now consider US extended deterrence an existential problem is because they have seen the United States and its regional allies strengthen their activities.

Recently, Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra and Manila have enhanced their defense work, engaged new partners, and sought to build a region-wide security architecture through new mechanisms such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, or the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States security arrangement, dubbed AUKUS.

To Beijing, these moves suggest that the United States is preparing to act militarily against China.

It is not surprising, then, to hear Chinese officials voice stronger concerns about US intentions. For example, Qin Gang, China's former minister of foreign affairs and former Chinese ambassador to the United States, said :“The US claims it wants to 'compete to win' with China, and does not seek conflict. But in fact, the so-called 'competition' by the US is all-round containment and suppression, a zero-sum game of life and death.”

Second, Beijing has been generally less aggressive than Moscow in countering US extended deterrence. Unlike Russia, which engages in overt, high-risk confrontations, as in Ukraine, China has favored incremental pressure, using“salami-slicing” and coercion.

That's partly because their tools are different. Beijing resorts predominantly to economic measures because China is an economic powerhouse, whereas Moscow employs political subversion and military force more readily because Russia is weak(er) economically but a military superpower.

But here, too, that's changing. As Chinese military power is increasing, Beijing is becoming more militarily adventurist. In the South China Sea, for example, Chinese vessels have of late repeatedly collided with Filipino ships, sometimes dousing them with water cannons and injuring onboard personnel. Worryingly, a just-released RAND report finds that China is redefining hybrid warfare to include the use of nonmilitary tools for enhancing lethality.

That's why Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, recently warned that“China continues to pursue unprecedented military modernization and increasingly aggressive behavior that threatens the US homeland, our allies, and our partners.”

Third, for a long time Chinese nuclear weapons did not have a major role against US extended deterrence. That's because the Chinese tradition supports a strategy of assured retaliation, and of not integrating nuclear strategy with conventional strategy, or pursuing nuclear warfighting, because of the idea that these weapons only prevent nuclear coercion and deter nuclear attack.

That's why Beijing has claimed to have a“self-defense nuclear strategy” and why it has maintained tight control over its arsenal, never delegating authority over nuclear strategy to the Chinese military. That's also why China has developed a small nuclear force and refused to engage in arms races, while pledging never to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The Chinese nuclear tradition stands in contrast with the Russian nuclear tradition. Moscow has made the large nuclear arsenal it has inherited from Soviet times, which it has modernized, the cornerstone of its defense policy, even emphasizing its readiness to use tactical nuclear weapons early (and first) in a conflict.

China, however, is now engaged in a rapid nuclear build-up, so change might be in the offing. Of course, China denies that its nuclear“modernization” – Beijing insists it is not a build-up – will lead to change, either in Chinese nuclear policy or posture.