What Trump Expects To Get From His Gulf Tour

So far, so good for Israel's government. Prior to the October 7 attacks, Israel was already in the process of forging closer ties to the Gulf states , with deals and diplomatic relations established with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain through the Abraham Accords that the Trump administration itself facilitated in September 2020.

A potential normalization of ties with Saudi Arabia was also in the offing.

But central to the agenda this week in Riyadh will be issues where Trump and Netanyahu are increasingly not on the same page. And that starts with Iran.

While the country won't be represented, Iran will feature heavily at Trump's summit, as it coincides with the US administration's ongoing diplomatic talks with Tehran over its nuclear program.

Those negotiations have now concluded four rounds . And despite clear challenges, American and Iranian delegations continue to project optimism about the possibility of reaching a deal.

The approach marks a change of course for Trump, who in 2018 abandoned a similar deal to the one he is now largely looking to forge. It also suggests the US is currently opposed to the idea of direct armed confrontation with Iran, against Netanyahu's clear preference .

Diplomacy with Tehran is also favored by Gulf states as a way of containing Iran's nuclear ambitions. Even Saudi Arabia – Tehran's long-term regional rival that, like Israel, opposed the Obama-era Iran nuclear diplomacy – is increasingly looking for a more cautious engagement with Iran.

In April, the Saudi defense minister visited Tehran ahead of the recent US-Iranian negotiations.

Netanyahu has built his political career on the looming threat from a nuclearized Iran and the necessity to nip this threat in the bud. He unsuccessfully tried to undermine President Barack Obama's initial efforts to reach an agreement with Iran – resulting in 2015's Iran nuclear deal. But Netanyahu had more luck with Obama's successor, helping convince Trump to withdraw from the agreement in 2018.

So Trump's about-turn on Iran talks has irked Netanyahu – not only because it happened, but because it happened so publicly. In April, the US president called Netanyahu to the White House and openly embarrassed him by stating that Washington is pursuing diplomatic negotiations with Tehran.

A clear indication of the potential tension between the Trump administration and the Israeli government can be seen in the ongoing skirmishes involving the US, Israel and the Houthis in Yemen.

After the Houthis fired a missile at the Tel Aviv airport on May 4 – leading to its closure and the cancellation of multiple international flights – Israel struck back, devastating an airport and other facilities in Yemen's capital.

But just a few hours after the Israeli attack, Trump announced that the US would not strike the Houthis anymore, as they had“surrendered” to his demands and agreed not to block passage of US ships in the Red Sea.

It became clear that Israel was not involved in this new understanding between the U.S. and the Houthis. Trump's statement was also notable in its timing, and could be taken as an effort to calm the region in preparation of his trip to Saudi Arabia. The fact that it might help smooth talks with Iran too – Tehran being the Houthis' main sponsor – was likely a factor as well.

Timing is also relevant in Israel's latest attack on Yemeni ports. They took place on May 11 – the eve of Trump setting off for his visit to Saudi Arabia. In so doing, Netanyahu may be sending a signal not only to the Houthis but also to the US and Iran. Continuing to attack the Houthis might make nuclear talks more difficult.

Critical observers of Netanyahu have long argued that he prioritizes continued war in Gaza over regional calm for the sake of holding together his far-right coalition, members of which desire full control of the Gaza Strip and de facto annexation of the West Bank.

This, many political commentators have argued, is the main reason why Netanyahu backed off from the last stage of the ceasefire agreement with Hamas in March – something which would have required the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Gaza Strip.