Syria's Shifting Sands: A New Middle East Order

(MENAFN- Daily News Egypt) The Middle East is no longer a predictable chessboard where moves can be studied and anticipated. Instead, it resembles a hurricane, unpredictable in both timing and direction. This is the reality we face.

The danger posed by the Political and military vacuum following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's Regime in Syria lies not only in its timing but also in the speed and far-reaching consequences of this shift, even for the powerful regional actors involved. The Syrian scene in recent days has been rife with contradictions that defy explanation. While global media broadcast celebrations of the regime's fall, Israeli airstrikes target all aspects of the Syrian army-from equipment and weapons to laboratories and factories. Every day, Israel conducts over 350 airstrikes on what remains of the national army, and at day's end, announces the details of its operations with complete transparency.

As Syrians celebrate, the Israeli occupation army advances deep into the Golan Heights, including Mount Hermon, claiming an additional 250 square kilometers. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared the Golan permanently Israeli and vowed to double settlement activities in the plateau.

On Syria's northern front, a parallel scenario unfolds. Turkish forces have invaded the north, occupying multiple cities and regions, all while denouncing Israel's expansion in the Golan. Simultaneously, they destroy Syrian army weapons depots in these newly seized areas and prepare to attack the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to tighten control over the Kurds.

Meanwhile, Ahmed al-Shara, also known as Muhammad al-Jolani, the general commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which played a major role in toppling the regime, appears to be taking a calculated approach. Recognizing that emulating ISIS's brutality would be counterproductive, he refrained from wreaking havoc in Damascus. Instead, he launched a media campaign, calling for reconciliation and unity, proclaiming,“I am Syrian, you are Syrian. I oppose Assad, not the country or its people.” He even announced on Al Arabiya that compulsory conscription would be abolished, relying instead on volunteers, signaling a shift in the willingness of Syrians to bear arms.

On the eastern front, American forces raised their flag over the Kurdish city of Kobane to secure it, while continuing to control Syria's vital oil fields.

The final outcome in Syria appears stark: Assad's regime has fallen, and the Syrian army has been entirely dismantled-an unprecedented event even compared to the 1967 war. Israel now firmly controls the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon. Turkish forces have seized more than 13 cities, cementing their influence. The United States has solidified its presence in oil-rich regions while extending legal protection to the Kurds and the SDF.

Syria, like Iraq and Lebanon, is a mosaic of sects, religious, ethnic, and political groups formed over centuries. Its future, therefore, cannot be disentangled from its complex regional environment. Yet the dominance of extremist jihadist currents at the core of Syrian geography suggests that the nation's future will be marked by sectarianism and politicization, aligned with the interests of powerful regional players. Such a scenario is unsustainable.

Syria's plight stems from more than seven years of cumulative failures. Israeli attacks, initially tactical, have had profound strategic repercussions, weakening the resistance axis and claiming key leaders. U.S. sanctions and support for armed groups exacerbated the situation, while internal Syrian conflicts and the Iranian regime's flawed strategies further undermined resistance. The assassination of Qasem Soleimani marked a turning point, emboldening Israel to act unchallenged in Syria, with the consequences now reaching Iran's doorstep.

With Assad gone, Syrians celebrate in Damascus while opposition groups scramble to organize a political transition. Yet the administrative failures of Syrian rebel factions, proven during their governance of large territories, cast a long shadow over these efforts. Western observers speculate that HTS might take charge, but their track record suggests otherwise. Even when controlling two-thirds of Idlib province, HTS struggled with governance and showed little commitment to political pluralism. Past attempts by opposition groups to govern areas like southern Syria, Damascus's outskirts, and Turkish-controlled regions in the north often resulted in militia rule and infighting, with efforts to unite factions repeatedly failing.

The greatest danger facing Syria is not solely Islamic extremism but the chaos likely to follow the opposition's victory. Regardless of the form of future governance, the challenges are immense, and the risks are imminent. Syria's social and economic crises, already overwhelming, are poised to worsen. According to the United Nations, 16.7 million Syrians need humanitarian aid, and 12.9 million suffer from food insecurity. Even after the conflict ends, Syria will require between $200 billion and $400 billion to rebuild, a figure far beyond the willingness of the US or the West to contribute.

The road ahead for Syria is fraught with uncertainty and peril. The fall of Assad is not the end of the story but the beginning of a new and turbulent chapter in the region's history.

Dr. Hatem Sadek – Professor at Helwan University

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