(MENAFN) On November 16, 2024, Syria marked 54 years since the "reform revolution," when Hafez al-Assad seized power. At that time, no one – not in Damascus, Tehran, or the West – could have predicted that just two weeks later, the Assad regime would fall. Yet, against all expectations, the unimaginable happened. A coalition of rebels, including al-Qaeda affiliates and secular opposition groups like the Free Syrian Army, with support from Turkey, managed to overthrow the regime in just 12 days of intense fighting, despite Assad having survived nearly a decade of brutal warfare in previous conflicts. Several factors contributed to this sudden shift. First, Iran and Russia, Assad's key allies, failed to intervene decisively when the regime needed them most. While Iran’s withdrawal could be seen as a tactical move, Russia lost its last foothold in Syria, effectively retreating from the Middle East. Second, the Syrian military, severely weakened by years of war, relied increasingly on Shiite militia proxies and volunteers, which further depleted its fighting capacity. Third, the rebels, having learned from past failures, prioritized controlling Syria's western, populated regions over the sparsely populated eastern territories.

The regime's fall brings both opportunities and risks. On the positive side, the weakening of the Iranian-led "resistance camp" creates new possibilities for targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, the toppling of Assad also presents several immediate challenges for the Middle East and Israel in particular. The first key challenge is ensuring that Syria’s vast stockpiles of advanced weapons – including missiles, air defense systems, and chemical-biological weapons – do not fall into rebel hands. Given the significance of these weapons, Israel must continue its strikes on Syrian arms caches to prevent them from reaching hostile forces.

The second challenge arises from the potential fragmentation of the rebel camp. A lack of unity among opposition groups could lead to infighting over leadership and strategy, especially in the post-Assad phase. This could result in the establishment of rival territories or cantons along the northern border, with jihadist factions continuing their efforts against Assad and potentially directing their attention toward Israel. Lastly, the ongoing Middle East struggle between religious and nationalist forces could tip in favor of Islamists. As seen after the collapse of regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya, Islamist groups like Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham, which seek to revive the glories of past Islamic empires, will likely gain strength. These groups will seize any opportunity to challenge weakened regional governments and extend their influence. In response to this new reality, Israel may find its interests aligned with those of Jordan, and could also strengthen ties with Syria's minority groups, particularly the Druze and Kurds, to navigate the emerging challenges in its northern neighbor.

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