Tough Talk On Nato From Putin And His Proxies May Hide A Willingness To Compromise

(MENAFN- The Conversation) With the war nearly three years old and the Russian Economy under severe pressure after a collapse of the ruble and rising inflation, the Kremlin needs to show domestic audiences that it remains strong. Recent rhetoric from the Kremlin and from proxies for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has focused on the country's valiant stand against an aggressive west as represented by Nato.

According to one poll , six out of ten Russians fear Nato, so being seen to stand firm against the US-led alliance is an easy win for the Kremlin, increasing its Legitimacy domestically in public and elite circles.

A recent interview in the popular Russian newspaper, Argumenty i Fakty, with Sergei Karaganov, a Russian political scientist and former Putin adviser, has provided a suitably hawkish take on the likely thrust of Russian negotiations over Ukraine and with Nato. Karaganov called for the“complete capitulation of Ukraine” and for the western alliance to return to its 1997 borders.

A year ago, Karaganov stated that to scare the west to stop supporting Ukraine, Russia must hit a“bunch of targets in a number of countries”. Recent changes to Russia's nuclear doctrine and the firing of the – thus far ineffective – Oreshnik medium-range nuclear-capable missile are further signs of the Kremlin's efforts to bring negotiations about on its own terms.

Karaganov's statements on forcing Nato back to its 1997 borders (effectively to its cold war borders) appear to represent the Kremlin signalling to multiple audiences. To a domestic audience, it shows that Putin takes a tough stance. But an international audience knows that the Russian way of negotiating is to demand the whole cake and then settle for three-quarters, having in reality been willing to accept half. So this sort of stance suggests that the Kremlin is open to negotiation.

Karaganov has played a significant role in Russian political life over 30 years and has always been seen as a hawk. His Karaganov doctrine of 1992 states that Russian speakers in neighbouring states should be used as a political force by the Kremlin to keep their countries close to Russia. Although no longer directly employed as an advisor to Putin, Karaganov remains close to Kremlin circles.

For the Kremlin, the bugbear has always been Nato's expansion in eastern Europe. Since the 1997 Madrid Nato summit, at which it was agreed to commence accession talks with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 16 European countries have joined the alliance.

A Kremlin ultimatum in the run-up to launching the fullscale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 called for Nato troops and weapons to be pulled out of all 16 of these countries. By rejecting it, Nato gave Putin the reason he needed to invade Ukraine while blaming Nato as a warmonger.

Karaganov's tough stance tells the Russian public that the Kremlin remains strong and determined to exert its influence in world affairs. An estimated 80,000 Russian soldiers have died since the war began and the economy is heading towards stagflation as prices rise and economic activity falls.

So, the Russian people need a show of strength from their government. Maximalist rhetoric projects power, fosters unity and legitimises the Russian people's sacrifices. Karaganov's message also fits with Russia's assertion that it's fighting in self-defence in Ukraine against an aggressive west.

But beneath the surface is another potential interpretation, perhaps aimed at Moscow's adversaries: that the Kremlin is open to negotiation. Putin has consistently called for talks but his idea of negotiations have been one-sided. He has called for Ukraine to obey the terms of a deal discussed in Istanbul in April 2022 but never signed.

This would have ruled out Ukraine joining Nato, demilitarised its army and given Russia a veto over external support for Ukraine. He says Kyiv must accept Russia's version of the “facts on the ground” and agree to demilitarise .

Russia's apparent willingness to negotiate plays to an audience of non-aligned countries who see the west as hypocritical for strongly condemning Russia's invasion of another sovereign state, having done the same in places like Iraq.

Being seen to want to talk also splits western leaders between those who want to hasten an end to the costly hostilities and those who still fervently believe that Russia must not profit from its aggression in Ukraine.

So public statements from the likes of Karaganov could well be a trial balloon to gauge both domestic and international reactions.

Yet, Putin faces some stark realities. While Russia has made advances in the autumn , the situation remains a long way from the the Russian president's claim in 2014 that he could take Kyiv in two weeks . Ukraine is still being strongly backed by the west and inflicting severe casualties on the Russian forces. And it's highly unlikely that the alliance will willingly return to its 1997 borders. So, Putin must hope for growing disunity.

At home in Russia all this maximalist rhetoric will provide a short-term rally-round-the-flag effect on the population. But against a backdrop of economic hardship, this will be harder to maintain , particularly if negotiations become drawn out and fighting continues to swell Russia's casualty list. Putin and his proxies will need to double down on their tough rhetoric.

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