(MENAFN- AzerNews)
Elnur Enveroglu
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What sort of impressions did the state visit of
President Vladimir Putin to Azerbaijan create in the
region?
What did the Foreign Ministry of Armenia mean by its
implicit response to Lavrov's accusation?
Good-faith support of Russia in the peace talks, or
being a mediator as a third party?
What are the common interests of the West and Russia in
opening the Zangazur corridor?
On August 18-19, the state visit of Russian President Vladimir
Putin to Azerbaijan was marked by very important events. During the
meeting, documents intended to develop friendship and cooperation,
as well as trade relations and investment, were signed between the
two countries.
Russia is the largest country in the region, and Azerbaijan
attaches great importance to strengthening relations with its
northern neighbor, Russia.
Azerbaijan, which regained its independence after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, further developed its relations with Russia. Most
recently, on February 22, 2022, a declaration of alliance
consisting of 43 articles was signed between Baku and Moscow.
The documents signed within the framework of President Putin's
visit to Baku completed some provisions of the declaration of
alliance.
Reasons for strengthening Baku-Moscow
relations
In 2020, Azerbaijan's retaliatory measure against the Armenian
offensive signaled a victory that could end the 30-year occupation.
However, there were certain obstacles in the course of the war,
which Azerbaijan could overcome only thanks to its political
superiority. Russia's good move in not preventing Azerbaijan's
military operations and anti-terrorist measures against separatist
groups in Garabagh in 2023 contributed to the quick end of the
Garabagh conflict. In addition, the withdrawal of Russian
peacekeepers from Garabagh in 2024 earlier than the time specified
in the agreement has once again demonstrated the official Kremlin's
special attitude towards Azerbaijan.
Subtle moments that bring Russia closer to
Azerbaijan
The 4-year period from 2020 until now is of exceptional
importance in the history of Azerbaijan. During this time, in
addition to the Garabagh conflict, Moscow's interest in opening
communications over Zangazur and reaching a peace agreement between
Yerevan and Baku has been the best reflection of the geostrategic
realities formed in the region. In the literal sense of the word,
Russia sees Azerbaijan as a beacon in the South Caucasus against
the backdrop of the worsening of relations with the West and
Armenia. In this regard, the state visit of President Putin to Baku
can be evaluated as the official Kremlin considers Azerbaijan its
most reliable ally.
Russia is already loyal to the issue of peace between Armenia
and Azerbaijan and it lambasts the Westernized Armenia that avoids
peace talks and refuses to participate in the bilateral
platform.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's last statement accusing
the Armenian side of sabotaging the negotiation process was a
message for both the West, which plays the role of influence, and
Yerevan, which is unable to fulfill its promise.
Considering the response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Armenia, it seems that the Pashinyan administration, which is loyal
to the dictates of the West, completely rejects Russia's
participation in the negotiation process. But what is the main
premise of Russia's proposal for peace talks? Is it to mediate in
the process as a third party, or is it just a good-faith
contribution that Moscow wants to make to the peace process as soon
as possible? Certainly, Azerbaijan is currently on the side of
conducting negotiations on a bilateral platform. Because the
participation of the third party in the negotiations causes certain
contradictions and slows down the processes. Here, the national
interests of the mediating parties impact the two parties reaching
a common agreement. But Putin's proposal is different from the
West's attempt to intervene, and he seems to be more in favor of
stability in the region.
Converging interests in the Zangazur
corridor
Recently, interest in the opening of the Zangazur Corridor has
begun to be felt more in the position of both the West and the
Russian side.
Both the war with Georgia in 2008 and the sanctions imposed by
the West after the war with Ukraine led to the narrowing of
Russia's transport opportunities, as well as the interruption of
its direct relations with Armenia and Europe.
The closure of the railway through Abkhazia and the serious
problems on the Upper Lars highway have cut ties with Armenia,
Russia's most important ally at the time, and reduced its hopes for
it.
Due to all these reasons, Russia is interested in opening both
the North-South Corridor and the Zangazur Corridor and expanding
the transport opportunities for the country. In addition, the
opening of the Zangazur Corridor provides Russia with a direct
connection to Iran via Nakhchivan and through the North-South
Corridor from Astara.
Although Iran, in turn, does not take a positive approach to the
opening of the Zangazur Corridor, the geostrategic realities in the
region have softened Tehran's position somewhat. Even the fact that
the West has started military exercises in Armenia does not worry
Iran as much as before. So every problem is feasible and has a
solution. If Iran, standing rigid with its conservative approach
and no-trespassing red line, is changing today, then there can be
no problem in opening the Zangazur Corridor. The only problem is
that Armenia will understand how much it can benefit from the
opening of the Corridor and at the same time it can get great
chances in the region with the thawing of the ice with Ankara.
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