Berlin And Madrid Resist Huawei Ban Arabian Post
Officials in Berlin and Madrid are pushing back against plans that would turn the EU's existing 5G security guidance into binding law, arguing that member states should retain discretion over how they manage high-risk suppliers in domestic telecom infrastructure. The dispute has sharpened as the Commission seeks tougher powers under revised cybersecurity rules that could require operators across the bloc to phase out components from vendors deemed vulnerable to foreign state influence.
The proposal is aimed at reducing Europe's exposure to suppliers from high-risk jurisdictions, with Chinese groups Huawei and ZTE at the centre of the debate. The Commission has long argued that dependence on such vendors could create risks for critical communications, public services, emergency systems and future industrial applications linked to 5G and 6G networks.
Germany's position is politically sensitive because its telecom networks have relied heavily on Chinese equipment, particularly in radio access networks. Berlin has already agreed a phased approach requiring operators to remove Huawei and ZTE components from 5G core networks by the end of 2026 and from certain access and transport network management systems by 2029. That compromise was designed to address security concerns while avoiding sudden disruption for Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone and Telefónica Deutschland.
Spain has taken a more cautious route. Madrid has not imposed a full ban on Huawei from commercial networks, though pressure has mounted after government and telecom procurement decisions involving Huawei drew scrutiny from European and US officials. Telefónica has moved to reduce Huawei's presence in 5G networks in Spain and Germany, while relying more on European suppliers such as Nokia and Ericsson for sensitive parts of its infrastructure.
See also UK hiring tilt favours temporary rolesThe Commission's planned rules would mark a shift from voluntary guidance to enforceable restrictions. The 5G Toolbox, adopted in 2020, urged member states to assess suppliers on technical and non-technical risks, including the legal and political environment in which vendors operate. Its implementation has been uneven. Some countries, including Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, moved faster to exclude Chinese suppliers, while others chose risk mitigation, supplier diversification or targeted limits on core network equipment.
The proposed cybersecurity framework would broaden the issue beyond telecoms. Draft measures cover critical sectors including energy, water, health, transport, cloud services, data centres, border systems, drones and connected devices. Telecom operators could be required to remove high-risk mobile network equipment within three years once restrictions are triggered, while timelines for fixed and satellite systems could be set separately.
Industry groups warn that a rapid phase-out would raise costs, delay network upgrades and reduce competition in a market already under pressure from weak returns on capital investment. A China-linked business study has estimated that a wider removal of Chinese technology from critical sectors could cost the EU more than $400bn between 2026 and 2030, with Germany facing the largest exposure. Security officials dispute such figures but acknowledge that replacement costs, engineering capacity and supply-chain constraints will shape implementation.
Huawei has denied posing a security threat and says exclusionary measures would breach principles of fair competition. Beijing has described EU efforts to restrict Chinese suppliers as discriminatory and has warned of countermeasures if the bloc proceeds with rules that single out companies on political grounds. The dispute adds to broader strains in EU-China relations over electric vehicles, rare earths, industrial subsidies, data security and Beijing's ties with Moscow.
See also Hormuz seizure raises Gulf shipping alarmsSupporters of the Commission's approach argue that Europe cannot build secure digital sovereignty while relying on suppliers subject to state influence outside the bloc. They contend that telecom networks are no longer ordinary commercial systems but strategic infrastructure underpinning defence, finance, transport, hospitals, factories and public administration. They also point to the need for consistent rules across the single market, warning that fragmented national policies leave weak links in cross-border networks.
Germany and Spain are not rejecting tougher cybersecurity standards outright. Their resistance is focused on the Commission's push to centralise decisions that have traditionally rested with national governments, especially where intelligence assessments, commercial contracts and domestic network architecture differ. Berlin wants a risk-based approach that preserves room for phased implementation. Madrid is seeking flexibility to protect network continuity and avoid measures that could force costly procurement shifts before alternative capacity is fully available.
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