Trump's Coming Kowtow To Chinese Dictator He Admires And Envies

In any case, a long-term solution will rely upon an agreement by both sides with China, for China is the only major power that is both a partner of the Iranians and capable of overseeing a nuclear agreement.

Unlike its strategic partner, Russia, China has been reluctant to intervene overtly and directly in foreign conflicts. It is supporting Russia's war in Ukraine, but has so far avoided getting directly involved, in either military or diplomatic terms. The same is true of Iran's war with America and Israel.

China has assisted the Iranian regime by continuing to buy Iranian oil and other commodities, insofar as they have been attainable. But it has also encouraged another of its partners, Pakistan, to act as a mediator between Iran and the United States. Even more notably, on May 6 it welcomed Iran's foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, on a visit to Beijing. Araghchi was certainly not there as a tourist.

It would not be in China's interest to embarrass Trump by making a big show of its role in bringing an end to a war that the American president began more than two months ago. As China is by far the world's biggest importer of oil, it shares an interest with America, Europe and the rest of the world in opening up Hormuz and getting the price of oil back down to pre-war levels. Displaying a willingness to collaborate over restricting the spread of nuclear weapons would also help burnish China's claimed credentials as a force for peace and stability, credentials that have been severely damaged by its support for Russia in Ukraine.

The hope must be that this positive role, and the leverage over Trump that it provides, does not make Xi Jinping overconfident. Taiwan is the country that stands to lose the most from an overconfident Xi, either through his being emboldened enough to attempt an invasion or a coercive blockade or through his persuading a grateful Trump to weaken US support for Taiwan's autonomy.

In truth, Xi is unlikely to attempt an invasion or blockade, for the examples of Russia in Ukraine and America in Iran have displayed clearly the costs and risks of military adventurism. China's better hope is to wait until Taiwan's next presidential election in January 2028, which could bring to power someone more favorable to China or at least more manipulable than the pro-independence figures who have run Taiwan for the past decade.

He is likelier to press Trump to reduce America's sales of weapons to Taiwan as an unstated quid pro quo for helping with Iran.

The oddity of this supposed summit of the giants in Beijing is that neither country is in fact in a strong position. One of the most enduring propaganda messages throughout Xi's 13 years as his country's leader has been the claim that America is declining while China is rising. In economic terms, this is plainly not true: China's annual GDP peaked at 77% of America's in 2021 but has since fallen back to only a little over 60%.

The once-widespread predictions that it would soon overtake the United States have been quietly abandoned as China's economy has been weakened by a property crash and demographic decline, and America's has powered ahead thanks to technology investment. Now, it would take a collapse of the US dollar and a big rise in China's currency to make it plausible that China could overtake America at any time in the next few decades, or possibly ever.