In Jab At Taiwan, China Ramps Up Military Support For Somalia

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Chinese engagement is, therefore, better understood as selective and strategic rather than transformative.

What are the strategic interests driving this engagement?

China is increasingly involved in Somalia because of Somaliland's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan and its progress in pushing for its own international recognition. Since 1949, Taiwan has been an independent, self-governing state, though the People's Republic of China lays claim to the island.

Beijing has worked over the past three decades to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. It's offered development, technology and infrastructure assistance in exchange for states severing diplomatic relations with Taipei.

As of 2026, only Eswatini and Somaliland in Africa maintain some form of diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

From Beijing's perspective, the fact that a small, de facto independent state in the Horn of Africa had the temerity to exchange diplomats with Taiwan was bad enough.

When Israel became the first state to formally recognize Somaliland's independence in December 2025, Beijing reaffirmed its support for Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. US policymakers are also pushing to recognise Somaliland.

China and Somalia's leaders in Mogadishu frequently affirm their support for“One Somalia” and“One China”, respectively. In their view, Somaliland must submit to Mogadishu's rule. Ditto for Taiwan: it must join the People's Republic of China.

Neither Somaliland nor Taiwan wish to be part of what they view as broken political experiments. Their larger, angry neighbors don't care. They resort to bullying and threaten violence – in different ways.

China has wealth, economic power and a global profile. It also has a huge military and growing navy, much of it tailormade to invade Taiwan. Despite this, Taiwan still prefers to go it alone, with support from the United States, Japan, Australia and others.

Mogadishu, on the other hand, is unable to exercise legitimate control over much of its own territory. Despite decades of external security assistance and military training, Somalia still has no capable military. The national army continues to underperform against al-Shabaab and remains entangled in clan-based politics.

Failure to shift the status quo in either Taiwan or Somaliland unites China and Somalia against smaller, weaker entities.

How does China's approach in the Horn of Africa differ from that of Western actors?

In my view, Beijing's growing interest in Somalia is less about development corridors and more about political alignment, diplomatic positioning and security cooperation.

Western states have tended to emphasise counterterrorism operations, governance reforms and security sector training. Other actors like Turkey and the United Arab Emirates have combined military engagement with infrastructure investment and commercial interests, sometimes becoming deeply embedded in Somalia's internal politics.

China, by contrast, has focused on regime support to reinforce Somalia's territorial integrity. This assistance has been less overtly military, and is closely tied to diplomatic objectives.

China prefers building technological and institutional dependencies – in telecommunications, technology and surveillance, for example – across much of Africa.

In both the short and long term, greater Chinese involvement risks adding another layer of geopolitical competition in an already fragile region. Rather than acting as a stabilising force, Beijing may find itself drawn into the same local dynamics that have frustrated other external actors.