North Korea Taking Its Nuclear Threat To The High Seas

They say that it features a substantial missile architecture, including 44 vertical launch cells (VLS) for surface-to-air missiles and 30 larger cells for cruise or surface-to-surface missiles. They note that it is armed with close-in weapon systems (CIWS), electronic warfare suites, a 127-millimeter gun, and a helicopter/unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) deck.

They also state that it incorporates the Russian Pantsir-M air defense system and is assessed to support anti-air, anti-ship, anti-submarine and anti-ballistic missile roles, as well as potential hypersonic cruise and tactical ballistic missile strike capabilities.

Russian assistance appears evident in the ship's design. In a June 2025 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) video, naval analyst Mike Plunkett says building such a ship in roughly 13 months would be“impossible” without outside assistance, citing strong design similarities with Russia's Grigorovich-class frigates.

WSJ also notes that Russia may have supplied the Pantsir-M air defense system, while Plunkett suggests Kim's 2023 Russia visit functioned as a“sales pitch” for naval technology transfers.

Choe Hyon is likely to serve as North Korea's primary maritime platform for nuclear signaling, crisis response and sea-based strike operations.

Previously, Asia Times reported on North Korea's purported nuclear submarine, Hero Kim Ok. The program is ambitious but technically immature, raising doubts about its near-term credibility. Key challenges include mastering reactor design, acoustic quieting and long-term sustainment.

North Korea's Soviet-era Romeo-class submarines suffer from noise, limited endurance, command and control challenges, and vulnerability to anti-submarine warfare, likely confining them to coastal“bastion” operations and limiting their deterrent value. True sea-based second-strike capability may be years away, reflecting a gap between strategic intent and deployable capability.

Taken together, Choe Hyon acts as a stopgap sea-based deterrent, buying time while North Korea's submarine leg remains technically immature. At the doctrinal level, Choe Hyon highlights evolving tensions in North Korea's nuclear command structure.

Notably, North Korea's 2022 Law on Nuclear Forces states that they obey the“monolithic” command of Kim Jong Un, but also states that if the country's nuclear command and control (NC2) is in danger of attack, a nuclear strike shall be launched“automatically and immediately” – showing a tension between highly personalized central command and preplanned automaticity.

An August 2022 US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) report suggests North Korea may adopt a hybrid NC2, combining centralized political control with limited delegation to improve survivability and responsiveness.

The report says Kim would retain sole launch authority over strategic, long-range nuclear weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), while limited delegation would apply to tactical systems deployed to frontline units.