US Revives Railgun Tests As Iran War Bleeds Air Defenses

The BBG(X), announced in December 2025, has sparked heated debate. Christian Orr argues in a 1945 article that the BBG(X) would reintroduce naval gunfire support (NGFS) capabilities provided by the Iowa-class battleships and add new capabilities, including railguns, lasers for point defense, the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N), 128 Mk-41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells and 12 Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic missiles, potentially making it a formidable combatant.

Conversely, Mark Cancian contends in a December 2025 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the BBG(X) is infeasible due to design complexity, high costs, and a strategic mismatch. At an estimated 30,000–40,000 tons, he says each ship could cost up to US$13.5 billion, comparable to an aircraft carrier.

He also says that the BBG(X) program contradicts the US Navy's shift toward distributed maritime operations, which emphasize numerous smaller, networked platforms rather than a few large, high-value targets.

He adds that, given development timelines, industrial constraints, and the likelihood of political turnover, the program would likely be canceled before completion, after consuming years and billions in development funding.

The widening US-Israel-Iran war may also be reinforcing interest in the railgun initiative.

Iran has inflicted serious damage on US missile defense systems by striking key sensors, such as the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar in Qatar and multiple AN/TPY-2 radars linked to Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries, disrupting the region's layered defense network, according to Turki Faisal Al-Rasheed in a Eurasia Review article.

Al-Rasheed stresses that without these sensors, remaining interceptors operate with reduced detection and targeting capability. He also points out a cost-exchange problem in which defenders must fire multimillion-dollar interceptors against cheaper missiles and drones, rapidly depleting stocks and leaving critical bases and energy infrastructure increasingly vulnerable.

Railguns could partly offset the shortcomings of missile-based defenses. A November 2021 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report notes that the US Navy has determined that the EMRG could be used for air and missile defense, in addition to its original purpose as an anti-surface weapon. The report notes railguns provide lower-cost, high-volume interception against missile and drone saturation attacks.

To put that into perspective, Neil Hollenbeck and other writers in a February 2025 CSIS article noted that, while cost estimates of Iran's Shahed-series one-way attack drones vary, they cost around US$35,000 per unit.

Further, Ari Cicurel points out in a July 2025 report for the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) that Iran's ballistic missiles, namely the Emad, Ghadr, and Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), cost US$250,000, $5 million, and $8 million, respectively.

Contrasting the price of US workhorse interceptors, Cicurel notes that a Patriot PAC-3 interceptor costs $3 million per round. At the same time, Wes Rumbaugh states in a December 2025 CSIS article that each THAAD interceptor costs $15 million.

Further illustrating the issue, Semafor reported this month that Israel is running low on missile interceptors, per an unnamed US official who said the US expects this but isn't similarly low on interceptors. The report notes that the US might try to supply more, but could strain its own stocks, which may already be below optimal levels.

In terms of per-shot costs, the US CRS stated that the cost of the US Gun-Launched Guided Projectile (GLGP), derived from the Hypervelocity Projectile (HVP), was estimated at $85,000 per round in 2018.

However, railguns still have their limitations. Aside from longstanding heat, weight, space, power, and barrel life problems, it is unlikely they could replace missile-based systems altogether.