China's Fishing Fleets Are Beijing's Secret Naval Weapon

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The shadow fleet is activated in disputed waters during periods of heightened regional tension, as seen near Japan and the Philippines, and withdrawn before allied diplomatic responses can take shape.

With more than US$5 trillion in global shipping transiting the Asia-Pacific annually, Beijing seeks complete oversight of all maritime movements, using the PLAN and CCG to mask their activities behind fishing vessels.

Any disruption to these shipping lanes could prove devastating to the global economy and key regional economies, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the US.

Much as Russia deployed“little green men” to maintain plausible deniability during its first invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, China could similarly employ its maritime fishing militia as“little blue men” in flashpoints such as Japan's Ryukyu Islands and Philippine-claimed islets.

Growing gray zone

On Christmas Day, December 25, 2025, more than 2,000 Chinese fishing vessels deployed to the East China Sea and assembled a mock blockade in a reverse L-shape formation. Two weeks later, on January 14, 2026, 1,400 fishing vessels performed a similar maneuver in the same waters.

As China escalates these fishing vessel tactics - coercion, hybrid warfare and mock blockades - Tokyo's posture has sharpened the context. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has ended strategic ambiguity over Taiwan, directly stating that Japan will militarily defend Taipei against Beijing, triggering a significant diplomatic rupture.

Alongside economic pressure - including restrictions on Chinese tourism and foreign labor in Japan - the CCP is pursuing information and hybrid warfare against the Takaichi administration, with intimidation via fishing vessel deployments emerging as the latest instrument.

China's use of nominally civilian fishing vessels serves not only as intimidation but also as a legal shield, complicating an American response under international law.

Under the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs ), US and allied naval vessels are prohibited from interfering with boats actively engaged in fishing, giving Beijing room to maneuver through what analysts call“lawfare.”

Should Japan, Taiwan or the Philippines directly engage the PLAN's maritime militia, China would invoke COLREGs in international courts while retaliating through economic and trade sanctions.

With a permanent UN Security Council seat and the world's second-largest economy, Beijing is well positioned to use its international standing to deflect condemnation of its maritime militia operations.

Response options

As China's maritime strategy grows harder to confront directly, the US and regional allies have several options.

The first is enhanced diplomatic cooperation on fishing rights and the enforcement of international law in territorial waters, including under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Second, sharing intelligence assets and using diplomatic back channels across the Indo-Pacific will be crucial to countering Beijing's maritime militia without direct confrontation.

Identifying the bases and ports where PLAN maritime militias stage operations, along with their commanders, could provide actionable intelligence for regional partners, enabling targeted sanctions and restrictions on militia commanders' movements.