China's Plan To Quarantine Taiwan While Avoiding War

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Such a scenario would not only be a problem for Taiwan, but for all those that depend on global maritime trade through East Asia, including Europe.

Disruption to maritime trade

Despite having several leading shipping companies, the vast majority of Taiwan's imports depend on global fleets. LNG, for example, provides nearly 50% of the island's energy needs yet Taiwan currently has no LNG carriers of its own and relies on vessels from Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Europe.

Shipping lines from Europe and countries in Asia also transport most of Taiwan's other imports and exports. These lines would undoubtedly be directly impacted by any embargo or quarantine.

Even shipping lines not trading directly with Taiwan but through the region would also likely be impacted. While the CCG has stayed close to Taiwan during recent exercises , the PLA Navy has deployed to maritime choke points along the first island chain.

These extended operations serve to both block outside interventions but also detect and shadow merchant vessels as they transit into the region. Such activity could cause significant disruption to wider maritime trade.

Shipping companies, for example, might take alternative, longer, and more expensive routes to avoid the threat while insurance premiums would likely increase significantly, adding further costs.

Given the importance of these waters, accounting for two-thirds of global maritime trade, economies around the world would be impacted. While this would have repercussions across the world, Europe and East Asia would be acutely affected given their reliance on trade with each other. Their merchant fleets also rank among the largest plying these seas.

Beyond the economic implications, physical threats to mariners and assets could also become a concern. The rapid expansion of the PLA Navy and CCG has raised questions over their capacity to generate the competent crews required to operate these ships.

The unfortunate incident of August 11 in which a PLA Navy destroyer sliced the bow off a CCG cutter while both were in pursuit of a Philippines coastguard vessel suggests such fears are not unfounded. Let loose on merchant vessels transiting the region, owners and crews would likely fear the consequences.

Responsibility to protect merchant shipping

While America has led escorting, convoying, and other operations to protect merchant shipping in the distant and more recent past, the US has also often delegated these responsibilities to European allies.

During the Cold War, for example, it would more often be European countries that took the lead on Naval Control of Shipping operations in the eastern Atlantic. That freed up the US Navy to focus on carrier strike and other high-end activities.

As a result, European navies acquired considerable expertise in the types of operations required to protect merchant traffic in a crisis. That includes escorting and convoy operations, as well as the complex command and control (C2) required to coordinate vast numbers of merchant vessels across huge sea spaces. Such expertise was why the European Union's counter-piracy mission, established in 2008 and led by the UK Navy, proved such a success.

While the US has led more recent responses to threats to merchant traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea, it continues to look to European and other allies for force contributions and operational planning and command expertise.

Given the UK and Europe would be significantly impacted by any disruption to maritime trade in East Asia, that same logic might apply to a crisis spurred by a quarantine or embargo of Taiwan.

Of course, the tyranny of distance and fears over the more proximate Russia might see European capitals initially reluctant to lean into this proposition. For many, protecting their trading relationships with China would also be a factor.