The 21st century global economy is defined by two competing forces: an insatiable demand for natural resources and growing consumer mandates for ethical provenance. Amid this complexity, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a UN-mandated global initiative, stands as the pre-eminent, and arguably the most successful attempt to govern an entire commodity supply chain.

Despite recent, often pointed internal and external critiques, the KP's historical triumph and ongoing evolution cannot be dismissed. Far from being an outdated relic, the KP's state-backed structure provides an indispensable framework that must be strengthened and emulated, particularly as the world struggles to secure ethical supply chains for a broad range of commodities.

The narrative from critics, such as the Canadian NGO IMPACT, claims the KP's core success is deceptive and that its narrow scope effectively“conceals problems” by confirming situations where it will not act. This argument misrepresents the scheme's original mandate. The KP was explicitly created with a singular, targeted purpose: to stop diamonds financing rebel insurgencies that destabilised legitimate governments, such as those in Sierra Leone and Angola. This mission has been overwhelmingly successful. Before the KP's implementation, conflict diamonds accounted for an estimated 4–15 per cent of the global market; today, this figure is consistently below 1 per cent. This reduction represents the virtual elimination of the original problem it was designed to solve.

Furthermore, the idea that the KP is the“wrong model” because governance has shifted to company-led due diligence creates a false dichotomy. The KPCS is a state-level floor of assurance enforceable by national laws. Due diligence frameworks, such as the OECD Guidance, function as a necessary market-driven overlay that addresses broader risks, like human rights and labour issues. The industry voluntarily adheres to both, demonstrating that they work in tandem. The KP provides the legal barrier to entry, while due diligence builds on that, with the KP itself representing a form of governmental due diligence required to guarantee certificate reliability.

Institutional progress vs. political inertia

Critics also frequently point to the KP's institutional inertia, arguing that its state-led, consensus-based nature causes a failure to address wider violence. While the consensus model can be slow, it is not a flaw, but a necessary feature for an international agreement covering 86 countries. Consensus is what prevents the KP from becoming a non-committal, top-down regulatory body. The slow pace is simply the price of a sovereign buy-in.

Despite this challenge, significant institutional progress has been made, including the establishment of the Permanent Secretariat and the digitalisation of KP Certificates, both critical institutional reforms. The claim that the private sector is exempt from audits also mischaracterises the system, for example the World Diamond Council (WDC) System of Warranties requires every buyer and seller to pass along a written statement certifying compliance, with failure resulting in expulsion from diamond exchanges and legal action.

Moreover, the argument that governments conceal problems is countered by the structure's inbuilt checks. The Civil Society Coalition (CSC) acts as a full Observer, flagging risks on the ground, while the KP's willingness to act is evident in the suspensions and embargoes imposed on nations such as the Central African Republic (CAR). It is important to state that the decision to lift the CAR embargo was not a sign of surrender, but conditional on a risk-based, verifiable action plan that prioritised monitored, legal trade over unregulated smuggling.

The challenge of evolving conflict

The most acute modern challenge is the risk of greenwashing and certifying diamonds that allegedly fund state conflict; however, it is important to clarify that this is a political mandate challenge, not a structural design flaw. The crisis hinges entirely on the narrow, non-political definition of“conflict diamonds,” which only applies to rebel groups overthrowing a government. The inability to sanction sovereign states stems from the fact that they are KP participants, not rebel groups. This requires a fundamental amendment to the KP's core definition, which, while discussed during this year's Plenary, remains as per its foundational mandate.

Additionally, the CSC's assertion that the focus on procedural concerns and technicalities alienates the KP from realities is inaccurate. Case in point, the successful launch of the digital traceability platform as part of the 'Year of Best Practice' is, in fact, among the necessary technical fixes required for any broader mandate changes to be securely implemented.

Conclusion: The indispensable model

As an indispensable foundation for ensuring conflict-free diamonds, the KP's challenges, according to its critics, are rooted in the constraints of its current mandate and the complex geopolitical nature of a consensus-based agreement. Regardless, the path forward is not abandonment, but the acceleration of debate on the necessary structural and definitional reforms.

The most compelling argument for strengthening the KP is its relevance as a model for governing other high-risk commodities, especially critical minerals. Today, global supply chains for minerals like cobalt, lithium, and coltan, essential for the green energy transition, are plagued by human rights abuses. The KP offers an unparalleled advantage: an international agreement that requires state-level certification for trade, obliging national governments to take direct ownership of their supply chains. This provides a level of sovereign accountability that no voluntary corporate compact can match.

Ultimately, the solution to complex global governance is not to discard the most successful existing multilateral framework, but to strengthen its definition and ultimately, emulate its structure for the commodities that define our future.

The writer is executive chairman and chief executive of DMCC.

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