(MENAFN- Asia Times) The surreal spectacle of Ahmed al-Sharaa strolling through the White House-greeting supporters, playing basketball with American military officials, and schmoozing with congressional leaders-would have been dismissed as fever-dream fantasy just two years ago.

Yet here we are, watching a former al-Qaeda affiliate, once hunted by American forces in Iraq, receiving the royal treatment from a US president who described him as a“young, attractive guy” with a“very strong past.”

Welcome to the latest chapter of America's endlessly futile attempts to reshape the Middle East in its own image.

Al-Sharaa's November 10 visit to Washington-the first by any Syrian president to the White House-represents a remarkable reversal of fortune for a man who spent years in American detention facilities and had a $10 million bounty on his head.

The Trump administration has now suspended the Caesar Act sanctions for 180 days and removed him from the terrorist designation list, all in service of enlisting Syria in the anti-ISIS coalition and potentially expanding the Abraham Accords.

But let's be clear about what's happening here: This isn't a triumph of American diplomacy. It's a predictable outcome of Washington's perennial habit of cycling through Middle Eastern strongmen, embracing whoever appears useful at the moment while conveniently forgetting their inconvenient histories.

Usual suspects, the usual script

The Beltway consensus has already formed around the al-Sharaa“opening.” Regional heavyweights Saudi Arabia and Turkey are lobbying aggressively on his behalf, eager to fill the vacuum left by Iran and Russia in Syria.

Congressional delegations are breaking bread with him. The administration is reportedly establishing a military presence at Damascus's Mezzeh airbase. All the familiar machinery of American engagement in the Middle East is humming along. What could possibly go wrong?

Those with longer memories might recall similar enthusiasms: Saddam Hussein as a bulwark against Iranian fundamentalism in the 1980s; the Afghan mujahideen as freedom fighters against Soviet tyranny; Libyan rebels as democratic reformers. Each time, Washington convinced itself it had found authentic partners who shared American values and interests. Each time, reality intruded with a vengeance.

The realist's dilemma

To be fair, engaging with Syria makes a certain cold-blooded sense. The World Bank estimates Syria needs at least US$216 billion for reconstruction-money that isn't coming from anywhere else.

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Al-Sharaa's government, whatever its origins, does control Damascus and has shown the capacity to conduct operations against ISIS cells. The alternative to engagement isn't some pristine democratic Syria rising from the ashes; it's continued chaos, refugee flows, and regional instability.

But acknowledging these realities doesn't require the theatrical embrace we're witnessing. There's a vast middle ground between treating Syria as a pariah state and rolling out the red carpet for a leader whose transformation from jihadist to statesman remains, at best, a work in progress.

The fundamental problem with American policy toward Syria-and the broader Middle East-isn't that it engages with unsavory characters. International relations often require dealing with distasteful actors.

The problem is that America consistently overestimates its ability to shape their behavior, misread their intentions, and ignore the likelihood that today's strategic partner becomes tomorrow's strategic headache.

Syria is far more consequential for Europe than for the United States, given geographic proximity and the refugee crisis.

Yet once again, Washington is taking the lead while European capitals follow tentatively behind. This pattern-of America bearing the costs and risks of Middle Eastern entanglements that primarily affect Europe-has persisted for decades, despite periodic promises of transatlantic burden-sharing.

A truly realist approach would recognize that Syrian reconstruction, stability, and integration should primarily be European responsibilities, with American involvement limited to genuine security interests. Instead, we're reprising our role as regional hegemon, complete with military bases, diplomatic initiatives, and the inevitable disappointments that follow.

The ISIS distraction

The ostensible justification for the al-Sharaa courtship is bringing Syria into the anti-ISIS coalition. As al-Sharaa arrived in Washington, Syria launched raids targeting ISIS cells across multiple cities-convenient timing that suggests careful coordination.

But let's not pretend ISIS represents an existential threat requiring dramatic Syrian participation. The group has been degraded significantly, and Syria already has every incentive to suppress ISIS remnants within its borders.

The real agenda is broader: normalizing relations with Damascus, integrating Syria into regional frameworks, potentially brokering Israeli-Syrian arrangements, and countering Iranian influence.

These are legitimate interests, but they should be pursued with clear eyes about the costs, limitations, and likely outcomes-not wrapped in the rhetorical flourishes about fighting terrorism that have justified so many dubious Middle Eastern adventures.

Al-Sharaa has made 20 foreign trips since appointing himself president in January, conducting a diplomatic charm offensive worthy of any ambitious leader seeking international legitimacy and economic assistance.

He has played his cards skillfully, breaking from Russia and Iran while cultivating relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and now the United States.

But charm offensives don't constitute democratic transformation. Al-Sharaa came to power through force, not elections. His country faces monumental challenges of sectarian reconciliation, institutional rebuilding, and economic reconstruction.

The notion that Syria will emerge from this process as a stable, pluralistic partner aligned with American interests requires a faith in political alchemy that Middle Eastern history doesn't support.

A modest proposal

What would a genuinely realist Syria policy look like? It would involve:

• Conditional engagement focused on narrow, achievable objectives: counterterrorism cooperation, refugee return, and regional stability
• Primary reliance on European and regional actors, not American military presence
• Skepticism about grand schemes for Syrian democracy or regional transformation
• Willingness to accept Syria as a functional state without pretending it's becoming a model democracy
• Recognition that reducing Iranian and Russian influence is fine, but not at the cost of creating new American commitments

Most importantly, it would avoid the trap of personalizing policy around al-Sharaa himself. Today's pragmatic partner has a history of being tomorrow's problem. The goal should be maintaining minimal necessary relations with whatever government controls Damascus, not betting American credibility on the latest Middle Eastern strongman's promised reforms.

Stubborn pattern

The depressing reality is that the American foreign policy establishment learns little from its Middle Eastern misadventures.

The same think tanks, columnists and officials who championed previous interventions are now explaining why engaging al-Sharaa represents shrewd realpolitik. The same tendency to overestimate American leverage and underestimate regional complexity persists.

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As one analyst noted,“The US is taking a large gamble on Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syria,”-which is precisely the problem. America has been taking large Middle Eastern gambles for decades, and the house usually wins.

The al-Sharaa visit may indeed mark a new chapter in US-Syrian relations. But unless Washington approaches this relationship with far more modesty about what it can achieve, and far more realism about the costs of deeper involvement, we'll eventually look back on this moment as another milestone on the road to disappointment.

The Middle East has a way of humbling American ambitions. Ahmed al-Sharaa's journey from terrorist designation to White House guest may be remarkable, but it's hardly unprecedented. And if history is any guide, the enthusiasm of November 2025 may look rather different when viewed from November 2030.

Perhaps the real question isn't whether America should engage with Syria, but whether it is capable of doing so without the grandiose expectations and inevitable overcommitments that have characterized American Middle East policy for the past three decades.

The early signs aren't encouraging.

This article was originally published on Leon Hadar's Global Zeitgeist and is republished with kind permission. Become a subscriber here.

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