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As for drones, he adds that they can swarm carriers, forcing defenders to waste limited interceptor missiles and ammunition, while destroying precise spots such as radars, communication links and flight decks without necessarily sinking the target.

Given those dangers, he mentions that distributing an expendable air wing across drone-centric platforms that could be built at a lower cost and tolerate attrition may be the future of power projection.

In line with that, China's focus on large carriers may leave it vulnerable. Those carriers may not be able to break out of the First Island Chain in a Taiwan contingency without coming into range of US and allied missiles and drones stationed in Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines.

Also, the Russia-Ukraine war has shown the effectiveness of even limited surface-to-air weapons against conventional aviation.

Dispersing naval airpower across smaller, more numerous drone carriers may help China offset Taiwan's dense missile and air defenses. This approach also aligns with China's massive shipbuilding and drone manufacturing strengths.

To illustrate those strengths, the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) pointed out in July 2023 that China's shipbuilding capacity is over 232 times that of the US, and controls 90% of the commercial drone market, manufacturing most of the components needed to build them, such as batteries, airframes, radios, cameras, and screens.

Its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy, which leverages civilian production and technology for military purposes, may incentivize the production of mini drone carriers.

China's development of drone carriers may also hint at the introduction of new naval tactics – ones that emphasize offensive power and standoff strikes to achieve a“fait accompli” in a Taiwan war scenario.

These new tactics could involve drone swarms launched from drone carriers and missile strikes from large warships such as the Type 055 cruisers and Type 052D destroyers, with traditional aircraft carriers providing fleet air defense – a possible role reversal at least for the opening stages of such a conflict.

In the opening stages of a Taiwan conflict, a multi-vector drone and missile attack could be the opening salvo of a decapitation strike that aims to neutralize Taiwan's leadership and paralyze its resistance.

Those strikes could be followed up by a swift amphibious and airborne landing operation to seize control of strategic points such as ports, airfields, energy facilities, military bases and government facilities before the US and its allies could react.

While China's mini drone carriers could contribute to a decapitation operation against Taiwan, they are not by themselves a war-winning weapon. Those small ships may be as vulnerable as large carriers to anti-ship missiles – provided Taiwan manages to ride out the decapitation strike and retaliate with its formidable arsenal of shore-based anti-ship missiles.

Should a Taiwan conflict enter an attritional phase, intense electronic warfare activity-similar to what is seen in the Russia-Ukraine war-may make carrier-based drone operations ineffective, similar to how improved Russian electronic warfare rendered Ukraine's once-lauded Bayraktar drones ineffective.

While drone autonomy could mitigate the effects of electronic warfare, the technology cannot yet match human beings in terms of rapid decision-making and drones themselves have limited payload and endurance.

That situation may force China to rely on manned aircraft for missions over Taiwan, with the risk that they may be shot down by numerous, dispersed and concealed air defense systems.

While it is plausible that China may be exploring the drone carrier concept as an asymmetric means to compensate for its disadvantages vis-a-vis the US and its allies using emerging technologies, a drone carrier has never been tested in combat.