China's J-35A Courting Buyers Barred From US F-35S

The US has refused to sell its top-of-the-line F-35 fighter to Saudi Arabia, given Washington's legal obligation to maintain Israel's qualitative military edge (QME) in the region.

Guy McCardle reports in a December 2024 SOFREP article that the US refuses to sell F-35s to Saudi Arabia due to deep concerns over technology security and geopolitical alignment.

At stake, he writes, is the F-35's proprietary software, which includes the source code that remains US-controlled, leaving Saudi Arabia dependent on the US for upgrades and operational sovereignty.

He also warns that integrating the F-35 with Chinese-made Saudi air defenses could compromise the jet's stealth and intelligence-sharing capabilities.

While Saudi Arabia has sought participation in the UK-Italy-Japan Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), slated to enter service in 2035, development delays in the program could raise questions of why Saudi Arabia should wait that long when the J-35 already exists. Saudi Arabia may thus consider the J-35 as part of a broader hedge between the US and China.

According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Saudi Arabia was the largest buyer of US weapons, accounting for 12% of US arms sales in 2024.

Ghulam Ali, writing in China-US Focus, observes that 70–80% of Saudi Arabia's arms come from the US, a dependency that aligns with both countries' interests, albeit at a cost.

He explains that US weapons are expensive, technology-sharing is limited and terms are subject to political shifts every four years. Crucially, he notes that these arms often come with political strings attached, which restrict their use in certain theaters.

Elizabeth Dent and Grant Rumley, writing in a September 2024 article for Defense One, recount how the US suspended offensive weapons sales to Saudi Arabia in 2021 with the condition that their resumption would be contingent upon the latter's compliance with international humanitarian norms and progress in ending the war in Yemen.

They note that Saudi Arabia responded by halting its air campaign, participating in UN-led peace negotiations and committing to training aimed at reducing civilian harm.

Dent and Rumley argue that the US leveraged Saudi Arabia's dependence on F-15s and Patriot missile systems to exert political pressure, demonstrating that US arms sales are not unconditional but tools of policy influence.

That US move may have impressed upon Saudi military planners the need for alternative suppliers whose arms come without political conditions.

Fuad Shahbazov writes in the Gulf International Forum that China quickly moved to capitalize on Saudi Arabia's dissatisfaction with the US, offering advanced drones and ballistic missile systems - weapons that the US is either unable or unwilling to provide, while also partnering with Saudi Arabia's emerging arms industry.

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Still, he cautions, China cannot replace the US as Saudi Arabia's primary security guarantor. He notes that although Saudi Arabia has looked to China to influence Iran to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, China is reluctant to get entangled in a larger Middle East conflict and is careful not to damage its close relations with Iran.

However, US arms exports to Saudi Arabia may not assuage Riyadh's fear of abandonment when faced with internal unrest or an Iran determined to retaliate with proxies, drones, missiles or even potential nuclear weapons, should its regime survive the ongoing conflict with Israel.

Oliver John, writing in a June 2025 report for the Gulf International Forum, argues that the memory of the US abandoning Egypt's Hosni Mubarak during the 2011 Arab Spring protests gives a sense of insecurity to the Saudi regime.

He observes that Gulf leaders increasingly interpret the US“Pivot to Asia” as a strategic retreat from the Middle East, a view reinforced by the US drive for energy independence.

John adds that although the Trump administration courted Saudi Arabia in 2019, its failure to respond to Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure that same year deepened doubts across the Gulf about the credibility of US security guarantees.

Ultimately, the importance of Saudi Arabia's defense choices lies not in whether it purchases from the US or China but in how it utilizes those tools to influence its regional diplomacy with Iran, Israel and other regional players.

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