US Should Look Before It Leaps Into South China Sea

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Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in Manila. Image: US Defense Department

Another influential security thinker there explained to me that the Filipino“general public hates China,” though they have also deplored the“double-speak” from Washington on the matter of their bilateral security treaty.

I was told that former secretary of state Mike Pompeo is regarded as a hero in the Philippines for helping to clarify the Mutual Defense Treaty, which underscored the nation's alliance with the United States.

A third Filipino defense strategist proclaimed confidently that his country could use the“Ukraine playbook” and that China would be defeated in the event of a military clash.

I hastened to point out that Pompeo's approach was not welcome in the second Trump administration and that the“Ukraine playbook” of major US support against great power bullying might no longer be viewed as sound strategy.

Traveling to China on the same Asia trip this winter, I found Chinese strategists to be in a similarly bellicose frame of mind.

One Chinese expert explained that Washington has“crossed the line” with respect to both Taiwan and the South China Sea. Another dismissed the deterrent value of the Typhon missile deployment, stating that Manila has“revisionist ambitions” and is“gambling.”

Consistent with such a warning, a Chinese newspaper editorialized in early March,“Ukraine and Europe went from 'diners' at the table to 'fish' on the menu. Will Philippines [be] the next dish...?”

Unfortunately for Manila, the comparison has some logic. To be sure, the Philippines is a formal treaty ally of the US, whereas Ukraine is not. And the Philippines has no land border with China, while Ukraine has a front extending 2,600 miles (4,184 kilometers) with Russia.

Yet both are cases of a smaller country confronting a revisionist great power. Kyiv and Manila have witnessed significant internal turmoil. Substantial disagreement exists in Washington over how to approach the security of these two nations. It must also be noted that Chinese conventional firepower may far outstrip that of Russia.

For the Philippines, its proximity to Taiwan is simultaneously a blessing and a curse. Pentagon planners see an ideal staging area in the circumstances of a Taiwan scenario. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Philippines has seen a dramatic surge of US military forces rotating through in the last few years.

The rise in cross-Strait tensions is not simply coincidental. Nor has growing attention from the Pentagon necessarily brought Manila greater security.

On his visit to Manila, Hegseth promised new support to the Philippines, including an agreement to conduct“advanced” bilateral special forces training operations on Batanes, the Philippines' northernmost island, which lies roughly halfway between Luzon island and Taiwan.

In keeping with the agenda of the so-called“prioritizers” in the Trump administration, such actions might assist Manila in order to balance against Chinese pressure, but this new initiative has substantial risks as well.