Latest stories

China's conventional subs shifting underwater war balance

No strategic spillover in the Middle East

Hamas leader's killing could trigger Iran-Israel war

China, meanwhile, lost control of its near waters in the late 1800s as European colonial powers and the US competed for access to China's markets. It marked a humiliation for China, hampering economic growth and contributing to the collapse of traditional dynasties and the emergence of competing nationalist and communist politics – and eventually leading to civil war.

More than shipbuilding

China is a global economic power, and that requires controlling its near waters and building a presence in far waters.

Beijing sees this as a necessary and acceptable part of becoming a power equal to the US But to the US – the dominant naval power since World War II – the process represents a challenge to its presence in far waters.

China already has the largest navy in the world as measured by the number of ships. Over the past 15 years, China has built 131 ships that are capable of operating in far waters, while 144 are designed for near-water operations.

As of 2021, China was operating or fitting out two aircraft carriers, 36 destroyers, 30 frigates and nine large amphibious carriers – the type of vessels needed to truly challenge US naval dominance.

These numbers are still dwarfed by the corresponding number of US naval ships. But they are bigger than any other nation's fleet, and without a doubt, China is developing a navy intended to project power into far waters.

But gaining sea dominance isn't just about shipbuilding. The Chinese plan includes“island building” projects to establish a presence in the near waters of Asian countries, including the Philippines and Vietnam. Elsewhere, it seeks to use its economic might to entice countries away from Washington's naval assistance.

Take Ream, a Cambodian military base in the Gulf of Thailand and former site of joint US-Cambodian naval exercises. The base was in line for a refurbishment under a deal with the US – an example of how Washington tries to maintain its presence in its Asian far waters.

But in a surprise move in 2020, Cambodia withdrew from the agreement .

Since then, funding from Beijing has provided for an upgraded base . There has been a continual Chinese presence at the Ream base in 2024, including the Chinese-funded construction of a pier and a large dry dock.

This naval presence serves China's goal of defending its near waters. But it also adds to Beijing's ability to project power into the far waters of the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

A presence at Ream also gives China a prime position along a critical point of the“sea lines of communication ,” the maritime routes through which much of global trade takes place. The nearby Malacca Strait is a key global choke point, through which US$3.5 trillion of trade passes annually – including a third of global trade, 40% of Japan's and two-thirds of China's.

Access to the Ream base in Cambodia puts China in the position to police those trade routes. China sees that policing role as positive and peaceful. The US and other countries fear that China could use it to disrupt global trade – although it isn't clear why China would do that when its economy relies on imports and exports.

Battle for influence

Ream isn't an isolated example; China has been trying to gain power and influence across the Pacific for years.

Over the past decade, Beijing has developed strong economic and diplomatic relations with Pacific island nations, including a deal with the Solomon Islands that sparked Western concerns of China gaining a military naval presence there .

Of course, the US is still a large and, for China, imposing presence through its bases in Japan and South Korea and its support of Taiwan. Washington has also started upping its efforts to outflank China among Pacific islands , inking a 2023 deal that would give US ships“unimpeded access” to bases there.

But the geopolitics of sea power is a process, rather than determined by current events. As such, the ebb and flow should be viewed through the trajectory of naval presence over a number of years.

Which is why the presence of Chinese warships sailing close to Alaska is an important development.