The Impact Of Illegal Drugs In Afghanistan On Political Settlement

(MENAFN- Wadsam) The result
of a study conducted by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
with the financial support of the European Union indicates that ongoing debates
on the peace and reconciliation process have largely ignored the production of
illegal drugs and its significant impacts on a possible political
settlement.

Drawing on the
author's long term research in Afghanistan, the paper analyzes the role that
illicit drugs and the monies they generate play in the conflict.

'The risks that illegal drug crop production -
opium, opiates, marijuana and increasingly methamphetamine — might pose to a political settlement is not raised at all,' the study
says and adds that the lootable and illegal nature of the products that limit
the state's ability to regulate and monopolize taxes on production, and the
amounts of money earned by different armed actors — those working for the state and those engaged in the insurgency - and
the implications this has for an enduring peace are overlooked.

According to the study, the amount of money
earned from illegal drugs production is significant and its trade is currently
the largest single economic sector in Afghanistan. 'More than 10 percent of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2018 was made by opiates alone and over US$ 40
million in taxes were earned by different armed groups along the value-chain,'
the study stated.

The study further
elaborates that opium poppy, as the country's most valuable cash crop, worth
US$863 million and employs more people
than any other industry in Afghanistan, over 500,000 Full-time Equivalent. The
crop occupied an estimated 263,000 hectares of land in 2018; three times more
land than it did in 2000 when the Taliban imposed an outright ban. And the opium economy provided
Full-time-Equivalent (FTEs) employment for as many as 507,000; making it one of
the country's largest employers, considerably more than the total number
employed by the Afghan National Defense Security Forces.

The paper recommends that
considering economic and political importance of the illicit drugs economy in
Afghanistan, it is unwise to assume the problem away or look to resolve it with
wishful and simplistic policy responses - or as the Afghan proverb says the sun
cannot be hidden by two fingers. By their very nature, illicit drugs are
difficult for governments to tame, particularly for those governments in or
coming out of protracted conflict and violence.

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