Iran War As A Cage Trump Can't Escape

And what of Iran itself? The regime, for all the genuine grievances of its people - and those grievances are real and deep - has now been handed the most powerful gift any authoritarian government can receive: a foreign enemy.

Ask yourself the question that seems to have eluded our war planners: when foreign powers bomb your cities, assassinate your supreme leader, and blockade your ports, do you rally against your government or against the foreigners doing the bombing?

The US and Israel launched the strikes saying they aimed to induce regime change in Iran and to target its nuclear and ballistic missile program. This, apparently, was the plan. Six weeks later, the regime, though badly battered, has not collapsed.

Iran's AMAD nuclear project had been suspended pursuant to Khamenei's own fatwa against nuclear weapons, a fatwa now rendered moot by the man who issued it being killed in an airstrike. The hardliners who remain do not carry the theological restraint of their predecessors.

The fantasy that American airpower can produce a“pliant regime eager to accept American terms” - to borrow the phrasing I used in a February analysis - has now been tested in the most direct way possible, and the answer is no.

Iran has not capitulated. It has retaliated. It has disrupted global commerce. It has rallied what remains of its proxy network. Hezbollah joined the war within days, and the Houthis resumed missile and drone attacks on US and Israeli-flagged ships in the Red Sea.

Escalating further, including any ground operation to“reopen” the strait by force, would constitute one of the most consequential strategic miscalculations in modern American history - and given our recent track record, that is saying something.

Talks collapsed after Iran did not agree to several“red lines” set by the Trump administration, including an end to all uranium enrichment, the dismantling of all major enrichment facilities, the retrieval of Iran's highly enriched uranium, an end to funding for allied militant groups, and the full opening of the Strait of Hormuz without any toll for passage.

This is the list of a maximalist power demanding the complete capitulation of an adversary that has not been defeated. Tehran, whatever its many failures, has survived eight years of war with Iraq in the 1980s, decades of sanctions, the assassination of its generals and scientists and now six weeks of the most intense aerial bombardment it has endured in modern history.

Iran is demanding control of the Strait of Hormuz, war reparations and a regional ceasefire, including Lebanon. The two lists are not yet reconcilable. But that is not evidence that negotiation is impossible - it is evidence that neither side has yet absorbed enough pain to make compromise politically survivable at home.

The third option - a negotiated settlement - remains the only path that does not end in either a prolonged quagmire or a broader regional catastrophe drawing in Russia and China. But it requires Washington to do something it has shown little appetite for: distinguish between its core security interests and its maximalist wish list.

Preventing Iran from acquiring a functional nuclear weapon is a legitimate American interest. Demanding that Tehran dismantle every centrifuge and pay reparations and surrender control of the strait and end all regional influence - that is not a negotiating position. That is a demand for surrender by a country that has not been defeated.

Vice President Vance left open the possibility that an agreement could still be reached, saying:“We'll see if the Iranians accept it.” That is, charitably, not a diplomatic overture. Pakistan, which has become a key mediator and said it would continue to play a role in peace efforts, and Oman, which has historically served as the quiet back channel between Washington and Tehran, remain available.

The question is whether this administration has the strategic patience to use them.