Russia Arms Iran, Cementing A Drone-Powered Anti-US Axis

However, Grieco says in a recent War on the Rocks article that an 83% decline in Iranian drone launches reflects observable behavior rather than confirmed destruction of capacity.

Grieco warns that reduced launch rates may stem from tactical recalibration, stockpiling for larger strikes, shifting operational priorities, or deliberate pacing, rather than attrition. She warns that dispersed drone systems like the Shahed are inherently difficult to track and assess, while uncertain stockpile estimates further complicate evaluation.

As a result, she says, interpreting fewer launches as degraded capability risks overstating battlefield success and misjudging Iran's remaining threat. Still, Iran could use a hand in replenishing its drone capabilities, with Russia well-positioned and strategically aligned to do so.

As noted by Joseph Bermudez and other writers in a Beyond Parallel report this month, Russia's Yelabuga drone factory produces 5,500 Iranian-designed Shahed-type drones a month, supported by a labor force of some 12,000 North Korean workers.

This reflects Russia's broader strategy in Iran, which, as Grégoire Roos noted in a recent Chatham House article, is calibrated and opportunistic, providing diplomatic backing alongside military-technical cooperation and economic coordination.

By remaining close enough to shape outcomes-including possible intelligence sharing-yet distant enough to avoid confrontation with the US or Israel, he positions Russia as a“spectator, beneficiary, and player,” benefiting from higher energy revenues, complicating Western strategy, and reinforcing its global relevance.

Beyond Russia and Iran, China may also be playing a key role, supplying the latter two with critical technologies and keeping them in the fight, with David Kirichenko noting in a July 2025 article for the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) that China supplies 80% of the critical electronics used in Russian drones and also provides machine tools, gunpowder and other materials to at least 20 major Russian military factories.

More importantly, China is navigating the Iran war through what Eka Khorbaladze, in a Think China article this month, terms as“strategic patience,” combining public diplomatic restraint with calibrated, deniable support.

Khorbaladze points out that while China condemns violations of sovereignty, calls for ceasefire and dialogue and avoids direct military involvement, it may provide indirect assistance-including satellite imagery, BeiDou navigation support and technical inputs-to strengthen Iran without entanglement.

The writer adds that China is insulating itself by stockpiling energy, diversifying supply and leveraging Iran's role in Eurasian connectivity, treating the conflict as secondary to its rivalry with the US and as an opportunity to turn regional instability into long-term geopolitical and economic advantage.

Taken together, these dynamics form what Kimberly Donovan and Emily Ezratty describe in an Atlantic Council article this month, an“Axis of Evasion” characterized by indirect yet deeply integrated cooperation built around sanctions-resistant supply chains.

Donovan and Ezratty say China acts as a key enabler by supplying dual-use technologies, components, and procurement networks that feed Iran's drone and navigation systems, as well as broader missile-related capabilities, while Russia complements this by scaling production, exchanging drone technology, and sharing operational insights, including satellite imagery and targeting support.