A Revitalized US Indian Ocean Strategy Cannot Ignore Africa

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What might have been his virtue signaling to a progressive, anti-colonial base could have profound ramifications in the strategic balance of the Indian Ocean, as it makes the future of the joint US-UK military base on Diego Garcia in question, especially if China continues to increase its influence in Mauritius, India's airfield in Agalega notwithstanding.

With China expanding its reach, neither the US nor India can any longer afford to take the western Indian Ocean and its littoral African states for granted. The second term Trump administration has given lip service to a more expansive Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The November 2025 National Security Strategy, for example, called on India to be more proactive in Indo-Pacific security and declared“keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open, preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes” to be a goal of US strategy.

However, the fact that the Strategy treated Red Sea navigation almost as an afterthought and then addressed it only in the context of Middle East challenges suggests continued incoherence. After all, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somaliland are African; their postures and security can impact freedom of navigation as much as Yemen and Saudi Arabia do.

On Jan. 23 the Pentagon released its new National Defense Strategy. Its importance is not only about what it says but also what it omits. While the Strategy mentions China almost two dozen times, it does not explicitly mention India. It sidelines Africa, with its few references relegated to counterterrorism.

It does, however, continue a broad focus on the Indo-Pacific Region and calls upon the US to“deter China in the Indo-Pacific” and to“set the military conditions required to achieve the [2025] NSS goal of a balance of power” in the region.

Absent a more sustained focus by the US or its chief strategic allies, Washington will forfeit that balance of power. Trump's tariff policy and his embrace of Asim Munir, Pakistan's army chief of staff, have shaken US-India bilateral ties. New Delhi essentially has a choice: it must be proactive in the western Indian Ocean to deny space to China or it must coordinate with the US to the same end goal.

New Delhi must determine how to outcompete Beijing not only in Mauritius and South Africa, but also in Kenya and Tanzania. While India commissioned the INS Jatayu in 2024 on Mincoy Island in the Lakshadweep Islands, it should push its military footprint further.

That would not only expand its military footprint in Agalega but also replicate it should China use its investments in Mauritius to leverage India out. India should also expand its presence in northern Madagascar and use its considerable, if underutilized, diplomatic and financial power to establish its own permanent naval base on Zanzibar or in Mombasa.

Indian politicians – especially old-guard officials with a more left-of-center outlook – might scoff at such military expansion, but the goal is not presence, but rather the growth and soft power ties that security can bring. An Indian base in Mombasa or Zanzibar would naturally attract follow-on Indian investment that would quickly become a hub for deeper commercial penetration in Africa.

If the Democratic Republic of Congo holds US$24 trillion in untapped minerals, metals and rare earths, there is no reason why New Delhi and Washington should cede the field to Beijing. Indeed, Trump's second-term efforts to make peace in Africa's Great Lakes region are predicated on an ability to tap Congo's strategic resources.

This might also represent a formula for US-Indian cooperation in Africa, with the US taking the lead in the interior and India developing its resources along the coast, all toward a common aim based in trade, free markets, regional development, and security.

India's initial refusal to recognize Somaliland seems a strategic own goal on the part of its Ministry of External Affairs. The Ministry's statement explaining,“India has longstanding ties with Somalia. We continue to underline the importance of respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country,” suggests ignorance of history and law.

Somalia and Somaliland represent a failed confederation akin to the United Arab Republic and Senegambia. In both those cases, India reverted recognition to their constituent parts as the federations failed.

India's endorsement of Mogadishu, too, stands in direct contradiction to the precedent it set when it recognized Bangladesh's independence. For India to embrace Somaliland, alone or in conjunction with the US, would signal that India will protect its interests across the entirety of the Indian Ocean Basin and compete with China.