China's SDV Sub Exporting Gray-Zone Warfare To The Gulf

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At the tactical level, the SDV-01 functions as a key enabler for clandestine maritime operations. Its utility lies in moving beneath surface surveillance during the brief interval between detection and engagement, enabling special operations teams to approach, insert or extract with reduced exposure to patrols and sensors.

Such platforms are designed less for decisive battles than for reconnaissance, sabotage, and targeting that create openings conventional forces can later exploit. That logic aligns with how Chinese special operations forces (SOF) are described in Western assessments.

John Chen and Joel Wuthnow wrote in a January 2022 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that China's SOF, including naval frogmen, are intended to play a preparatory role in a Taiwan seizure campaign by infiltrating ahead of the main landing force via special mission craft, submarines or helicopters to conduct reconnaissance, targeting, obstacle clearance and sabotage.

They explain that frogmen and other SOF would scout beaches and approaches, mark or clear obstacles, attack key targets such as ports, radar sites and command posts, guide precision strikes and conduct raids to disrupt defenders before and during the landing.

The same logic extends beyond Taiwan to the surrounding maritime geography. As outlined by Chad Machiela and other writers in an October 2025 Small Wars Journal article, PLA SOF could conduct rapid“micro-occupation” seizures of specific Philippine-held or claimed features to support a Taiwan campaign and expand control in the South China Sea.

Machiela and his co-authors argue that Mavulis Island could be seized within hours by PLA SOF to position sensors and missiles controlling the Bashi Channel, a critical chokepoint between the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea.

They add that heliborne or amphibious forces could take Itbayat and Batan (Basco) to create forward operating bases, and describe coercive takeover playbooks for Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Shoal and Sabina Shoal using maritime militia and follow-on forces to establish faits accomplis that secure flanks and chokepoints during a Taiwan contingency.

Beyond the South China Sea, similar anxieties shape Japan's concerns over the Senkaku Islands. Reflecting those concerns, Kiyofumi Iwata mentions in a June 2025 SCMP article that China is laying the groundwork for a“landing and absorption” of the Senkaku Islands rather than merely posturing.

He argues that intensifying coast guard incursions, helicopter operations and expanding ship deployments point to preparations for an on-the-ground operation, with equipment upgrades and training focused on disembarkation missions.

A more gray-zone-focused scenario appears in Japanese policy analysis. Writing in June 2021 in the Japan Foreign Policy Forum, Watanabe Tsuneo argued that a Chinese takeover of the Senkaku Islands is most plausibly envisioned not as a conventional amphibious assault but as a gray-zone seizure by special forces or maritime militia to create a fait accompli.

Tsuneo warns that Chinese personnel could secretly land, raise the Chinese flag and refuse to withdraw, exploiting legal and response gaps to delay Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) while consolidating control.

Placed against this backdrop, the appearance of the SDV-01 in Saudi Arabia looks less like a niche product pitch and more like the export of a particular way of war-one that emphasizes stealthy insertion, deniable presence and the creation of faits accomplis before an opponent can organize a response.

Maritime security in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz is fragile, with recent Iranian tanker seizures and missile drills around the region underscoring why Gulf states might consider enhanced littoral and special operations tools to protect critical shipping lanes.