How Japan Can Function As Taiwan Deterrence Logistics Hub

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If Russia wished to interrupt aid to Ukraine at its source, it would need to attack Poland – triggering Article 5 and war with NATO. Japan faces a more dangerous prospect: a Taiwan invasion scenario likely includes simultaneous strikes on US bases across the Western Pacific, potentially including Japanese territory.

Even in a blockade scenario short of full invasion, Beijing possesses extensive“gray zone” capabilities to interrupt maritime and air transport without triggering automatic alliance responses.

As Oriana Skyler Mastro and Brandon Yoder note in a recent Foreign Affairs analysis, deterrence presents an inherent paradox:“Do too little and Beijing may gamble it can seize Taiwan before Washington is able to respond. Do too much and Chinese leaders may conclude that force is the only remaining path to unification.”

Japan's potential role as a logistics hub sits squarely within this dilemma – visible preparations might provoke precisely what they aim to deter. However, their recommendation that“military upgrades should be concealed or downplayed until they are fielded” conflicts with the transparency required for democratic legitimacy and the visible commitment necessary to reassure Taiwan.

Taiwan's own vulnerabilities compound these challenges. Research by Morgado and Hosoda examining Taiwan's resilience identifies fundamental weaknesses: food self-sufficiency at only 30.7%, energy import dependency at 96.85%, and inadequate stockpiling systems for critical materials including rare earth elements.

Taiwan's merchant fleet has shrunk dramatically, with only 13% of Taiwanese-owned vessels flying the ROC flag – the remainder registered as flags of convenience and potentially unavailable during crisis.

Their analysis concludes that while Taiwanese authorities have implemented some resilience measures,“policies for securing energy, resources and food are not designed for the worst-case scenario of a complete blockade of Taiwan.”

Domestic political constraints in Japan mirror those identified in Taiwan. Japanese customs infrastructure would strain under massive increases in military cargo. Local governments and communities in a country with strong pacifist traditions would face unprecedented pressures.

Unlike Poland, where anti-Russian sentiment creates broad consensus, Japanese public opinion on China remains complex. China is Japan's second-largest trading partner and its primary security concern – a tension absent in Poland's relationship with Russia.

The Trump administration's National Security Strategy reveals an emerging view that most US allies no longer meet critical security requirements amid renewed great-power competition. The strategy emphasizes“burden-sharing and burden-shifting,” with the Hague Commitment pledging NATO countries to spend 5% of GDP on defense. Washington increasingly distinguishes between allies requiring constant support and those capable of assuming primary regional security responsibilities.

Israel appears as the model – competent and capable of managing regional security challenges, particularly regarding Iran. Poland aims to become NATO's first member reaching the 5% defense spending threshold. Reportedly, the undisclosed NSS version lists Warsaw among European states meriting closer Washington ties.

Yet, Israel manages Iran, where regime change remains plausible. Poland faces Russia – a formidable challenge. Japan confronts not only North Korea but China, a peer competitor of entirely different magnitude. If Washington is genuinely preparing for major power conflict fought not through broad coalitions but with select trusted allies, the equation changes fundamentally. Poland and Japan would function less as logistics hubs and more as forward partners or bulwarks managing Russia and China.

This role transformation would carry several implications. Burden-sharing demands would intensify beyond current levels. Japan would face pressure for defense spending exceeding even its recent increases toward 2% of GDP. The nature of support would shift from passive logistics to active defense integration, requiring not just expanded storage facilities but integrated command and control, advanced capabilities in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaisance and potentially forward-deployed US systems requiring explicit Japanese political support.

Rather than expecting Japan to become a“second Poland,” Washington should pursue incremental capacity-building focusing on gradual, sustainable infrastructure improvements to avoid both Chinese provocation and domestic backlash. Minilateral distribution of logistics responsibilities across Australia, South Korea and the Philippines would reduce political exposure for any single country while improving overall resilience. Prioritizing deterrence by denial – making Taiwan difficult to conquer rather than focusing on sustained conflict logistics – addresses the immediate invasion threat more effectively.

Addressing Taiwan's fundamental vulnerabilities in food security, energy resilience and critical minerals stockpiling must precede extensive Japanese logistics infrastructure development. Japan supporting Taiwan makes only limited strategic sense if Taiwan cannot maintain basic societal function under pressure.