China's Quad Counter Centers On Building An Anti-India Arc

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and access to Kyaukpyu port provide Beijing with both Indian Ocean reach and potential electronic intelligence sites monitoring Indian forces. For New Delhi, years of investment in Myanmar's democratic transition and Act East policy have been largely neutralized.

On the Himalayan crest, Nepal has shifted from near-exclusive Indian influence to contested space. Chinese-backed roads toward Tibet and a proposed trans-Himalayan railway, rising investment commitments above $2 billion and close party-to-party links with Kathmandu's communist elites give Beijing unprecedented leverage.

The 2020 map dispute over Kalapani underlined how easily China can amplify India-Nepal frictions.

In the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka and the Maldives anchor China's southern and central arcs.

The 99-year lease of Hambantota following Sri Lanka's debt distress and the multibillion-dollar Colombo Port City project give Beijing a long-term foothold astride vital sea lanes just off India's southern coast.

Even if described as commercial, port visits by Chinese submarines at Colombo have already demonstrated latent military utility.

The Maldives' sharp tilt under President Mohamed Muizzu, elected on an“India Out” platform, is an even starker signal. His demand to remove Indian military personnel and his opening to greater Chinese investment and security cooperation put a key mid-ocean state controlling central Indian Ocean shipping lanes in play for Beijing.

For India, seeing a traditionally friendly microstate pivot toward China carries outsized psychological and strategic impact.

Bangladesh may prove the most consequential swing state in this constellation.

Dhaka has preserved strong ties with India but relies heavily on China for arms and infrastructure, including marquee projects such as the Padma Bridge and deep-sea port development at Matarbari and Payra.

Chinese activity in and around Chittagong, including facilities linked to submarine operations, places China inside the Bay of Bengal, eroding India's long-assumed naval dominance there.

Tensions over river waters and border management already test India-Bangladesh relations. A leadership change in Dhaka could move policy closer to Beijing and complete a de facto encirclement of India's eastern flank.

What makes this arc particularly dangerous for India is its convergence with Pakistan's long-standing strategy.

China and Pakistan together create a two-front scenario: continental pressure in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh and a western front via Pakistan, combined with a rising Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Any crisis with China on the Line of Actual Control will now be viewed in New Delhi through the lens of possible Pakistani opportunism and maritime vulnerability.

Diplomatically, this convergence is visible in China's repeated UN shielding of Pakistan-based militants and aligned positions on Kashmir in multilateral forums, constraining India's room for maneuver.

India's options are constrained by asymmetries of both economics and geography.

Bilateral trade with China reached roughly $136 billion in 2023, making China India's largest trading partner, and has continued to hover above the $100 billion mark even amid border clashes. Efforts to derisk and diversify supply chains are real but will take years to materially reduce dependence on Chinese manufacturing.