(MENAFN- Amman Net) On October 26, 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty, known as the Wadi Araba Agreement, amid official promises that peace would open the doors to development and economic prosperity, transforming Jordan into a regional and investment hub. Today, more than three decades later, economic realities and official indicators up to 2025 reveal that the gains have remained limited. While the country has borne political, economic, and social costs, Jordanian citizens have yet to see the“fruits of peace” that were promised.

The treaty included provisions concerning the demarcation of borders, under which Jordan regained lands that it later leased to Israel for several years. The agreement also stipulated“full normalization,” including the opening of Israeli and Jordanian embassies in each country, issuing tourist visas, opening air routes, and establishing economic exchanges.

Conditional and Unsustainable Financial Gains

The first gains Jordan realized after the agreement were debt exemptions exceeding $3 billion and an increase in U.S. aid from $35 million in 1993 to $1.6 billion annually by 2024–2025. These funds were not the result of active trade or joint investment projects with Israel but rather political rewards for remaining on the path of settlement, tied closely to regional developments and U.S. balances of power.

Domestically, despite the treaty's stipulation for comprehensive normalization across various fields, the Jordanian street continues to reject engagement in any form of normalized relations with Israel.

The Israeli market largely remained closed. According to data from the Jordanian Department of Statistics (2024), Jordan's exports to Israel amounted to only about $280 million-a modest figure compared to trade with other countries, such as the United States or the European Union, which reaches nearly $2.5 billion.

The treaty also led to the establishment of Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs), which required factories-mostly in the textile and garment sector-to include at least 9% Israeli components in their products to gain duty-free access to the U.S. market.

Later, these zones witnessed a significant decline in the number of factories, according to Fathallah Al-Omrani, head of the Textile and Garment Workers Syndicate. The number of factories fell from 117 in 1995 to 75, and eventually to very limited numbers. This decline is attributed to the relocation of investments to countries with lower labor and production costs, such as Egypt. As for the labor force employed in these factories, it is estimated at around 40,000 workers, most of whom are foreign laborers.

Economic Indicators

Official figures highlight the fragility of the economic gains from peace. Public debt rose from JD 7.5 billion in 1994 to JD 41.3 billion (around $58 billion) by the end of 2024, equivalent to about 89% of GDP, according to the Jordanian Ministry of Finance (2025).

Unemployment continued to rise, reaching 21% among Jordanians overall and over 40% among youth, according to the Department of Statistics. In 2024, GDP growth was only 2.8%, far below the government target of 5%. These figures clearly indicate that peace has not driven sustainable economic development nor alleviated the structural crises facing Jordan's economy.

Popular Rejection

Despite the treaty's provisions for comprehensive normalization, the Jordanian public continues to reject participation in any form of normalized relations with Israel. The kingdom regularly witnesses marches, protests, and campaigns calling for the treaty's cancellation and boycotting any normalization activities.

After more than 30 years, Jordan has not achieved the promised economic prosperity. While gains have been limited and conditional, political, social, and economic challenges remain more pronounced. Normalization has remained purely formal, failing to evolve into genuine popular or developmental partnerships, and it has complicated the balance between national sovereignty and economic interests. Political analyst Mundher Al-Hawarat asserts that the agreement“has achieved neither peace, security, nor economic prosperity.”

According to Mohammad Al-Absi, a member of the“Enemy Gas is Occupation” campaign,“The ill-fated Wadi Araba Treaty is the root of all our current suffering; it opened the door wide to compromising Jordan's energy security, sovereignty, and the dignity of its people for the benefit of the Zionist enemy.”

Al-Hawaratt further explained:“Jordan still faces economic crises and declining per capita income, while also being subjected to continuous Israeli threats, including pressures on the United States and the cancellation of UNRWA. This effectively deprives refugees of a political platform, leading to their potential settlement in Jordan, which undermines the kingdom's strategic security.”

The treaty also called for“removing all forms of discrimination that hinder the establishment of normal economic relations and ending economic boycotts directed at the other party, as well as cooperating to remove economic boycotts imposed by third parties.”

Political Costs

Politically, Jordan has paid a heavy price for maintaining relations with Israel. The past years have seen repeated crises deepening popular anger and rejection of normalization. These include recurring Israeli attacks on Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, contradicting the treaty's recognition of Hashemite custodianship, the killing of Jordanian citizens by an Israeli embassy guard in Amman in 2017 with no real accountability, and repeated Israeli statements on annexing the Jordan Valley-causing official concern and widespread public outrage.

Gas and Water: Agreements that Deepened Dependence

In 2016, Jordan signed an agreement to import Israeli gas worth around $10 billion to supply power plants until 2035. The agreement fully took effect in early 2020, covering about 40% of Jordan's electricity needs. Although the government justified it as saving around $300 million annually, experts argue that the deal deprived the Jordanian economy of alternative local investments in solar and wind energy, which could have created thousands of jobs and strengthened economic sovereignty.

Mohammad Al-Absi added:“While successive governments failed to impose normalization at the popular level, they resorted to a deal forcing all of us to indirectly fund Zionist terrorism through electricity reaching every home and sector, affecting every citizen.”

He continued:“Meanwhile, this agreement prevents investing approximately $10 billion locally in projects capable of enhancing our energy security, growing the economy, and creating tens of thousands of jobs for our citizens.”

Regarding water sharing, Article Six of the Wadi Araba Treaty stipulated“a comprehensive and permanent settlement of all water issues, recognizing fair allocations from the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers and the Wadi Araba groundwater, according to agreed principles, quantities, and quality.”

However, water experts argue that this division is not fair in practice. Environmental and water expert Dr. Sufyan Al-Tal notes that“Israel exploits groundwater resources in the Jordan Valley by drilling numerous wells, despite the treaty allowing new wells only if agreed wells dry up.”

Al-Tal also attributes the sharp decline in the Dead Sea water level to Israel's diversion of Jordan River tributaries through pipelines, turning the river into a near sanitary hazard.

These economic facts coincide with widespread popular and political rejection of economic normalization with Israel, especially amid the escalating war in Gaza and regional conflicts. As a result, successive governments have failed to secure genuine popular acceptance of economic partnerships with Israel.

After more than three decades since the signing of the Wadi Araba Agreement, it is clear that the promised“economic peace” remains confined to slogans, while the real costs are tangible politically, economically, and socially. Development has not materialized on the ground, prosperity has not reached citizens, Jordan's economy remains dependent on external factors, and popular opposition to normalization persists.

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