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Sharp noted that concentrated basing improves throughput but risks exposure to Chinese missile salvos while dispersed basing increases survivability but dilutes operational tempo. He cautioned that attrition could erase the fleet in weeks, making sustainability a central dilemma.

Placing those ideas in a broader framework, Eric Rosenbach and others in a January 2025 Belfer Center report note that loyal wingmen developed under the US DoD's Replicator initiative are designed for denied electronic environments, which complicates Chinese targeting and reduces risks to US personnel.

They judged fully autonomous systems to be five years away but said semi-autonomous drones could already add surveillance, jamming and precision strikes, boosting deterrence.

Yet vulnerabilities remain. In a February 2025 interview with the Hudson Institute, Major General Joseph Kunkel stressed that the greatest challenge to integrating autonomy and artificial intelligence (AI) into the US Air Force's Force Design is not the technology itself, but rather how it is integrated into broader systems.

He noted that while autonomy, AI and all-domain sensing are“really, really important,” combat success will depend less on individual platforms and more on system-level integration, particularly how AI is woven into sensing, decision-making and mission threads.

Kunkel emphasized that the“magic happens” when asymmetric, long-range and core capabilities are combined into a mission fabric, underscoring that integration-not isolated technological advances-is the real hurdle.

Furthermore, in a RAND report published this month, Shanshan Mei noted that Chinese analysts have identified the“loyal wingman” concept as vulnerable to electromagnetic disruption, cyberattacks and data corruption, particularly given its reliance on distributed networks.

She cited People's Liberation Army (PLA) writings suggesting that manned-unmanned teaming could be cracked by isolating nodes, corrupting data flows or overwhelming systems with information overload. Without hardened spectrum defenses and standardized protocols, Mei warned, CCAs could quickly degrade under PLA countermeasures.

To offset such risks, J Michael Dahm argued in a July 2025 article in Air and Space Forces Magazine that the US intends to employ CCAs within a Disaggregated Collaborative Air Operations (DCAO) framework. Dahm says this approach would allow fifth-generation fighters to act as autonomous command hubs, directing CCAs and legacy jets through low-emission communications.

By minimizing network dependence and decentralizing control, Dahm said, the US aims to blunt Chinese information warfare while keeping decision-making at the tactical edge. In this framework, he says CCAs could still strike and jam when disconnected, frustrating PLA attempts to paralyze networks.

Still, questions remain about expectations. Grant Georgulis warned in a July 2025 Air and Space Forces Magazine piece that CCAs should not be conflated with the low-cost drones that dominate ground battles in Ukraine but lack relevance in terms of air superiority.