A New Pearl In China’S Necklace? Bangladesh’S Pivot On South Asia’S Strategic Board

(MENAFN- The Rio Times) (Analysis) On March 26, 2025, as Bangladesh marked its 54th Independence Day-a milestone born of India's pivotal support in 1971-Muhammad Yunus, the nation's interim leader, made a striking choice.

Rather than joining his people in celebration, he landed in Beijing for his first overseas state visit, a decision that reverberated across South Asia.

Yunus's remarks, framing India's northeastern Seven Sisters as“landlocked” and Bangladesh as their sole“guardian of the ocean,” sharpened tensions with New Delhi while signaling a deeper alignment with China.

Securing $2.1 billion in Chinese investments, Yunus positioned Bangladesh not merely as a neighbor but as a critical player in the Bay of Bengal, a vital link for India's northeast, and a new node in China's strategic network encircling its rival.

This calculated move, rooted in economic necessity, marks Bangladesh's emergence as a bold participant in South Asia's intensifying geopolitical contest, with implications that stretch from Delhi to the Indo-Pacific.


A Deliberate Signal on a Historic Day
Yunus's absence from Dhaka's Independence Day festivities was more than a scheduling quirk; it was a statement. Bangladesh's liberation, achieved through India's military backing during a brutal nine-month war, has long anchored bilateral ties.

For Yunus to spend this day in China, securing agreements that elevate Bangladesh's role in regional trade, suggested a shift from traditional alignments.

His comments about the Seven Sisters-Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura-being dependent on Bangladesh for maritime access provoked swift backlash.

Assam's Chief Minister, Himanta Biswa Sarma, called them“offensive,” reflecting India's sensitivity to any challenge to its northeastern security.

Yunus, a Nobel laureate steering Bangladesh through economic strain and political uncertainty after Sheikh Hasina's 2024 ouster, faces immense pressure.

With foreign reserves dwindling, a 37% U.S. tariff threat looming, and Western aid suspended, the $2.1 billion pledged by China-including $400 million for Mongla seaport and $350 million for Chattogram's economic zone-offers a lifeline.

Yet the timing of his visit hints at ambition beyond survival: Yunus envisions Bangladesh as a maritime hub, leveraging its 405-kilometer coastline to reshape regional dynamics.

By pitching cooperation with China, he asserts Dhaka's agency, even at the risk of straining ties with India, a neighbor whose goodwill remains essential.


The Seven Sisters: Bangladesh's Leverage and India's Concern
India's northeastern states, home to 45 million people, are rich in resources but geographically isolated, connected to the mainland by the Siliguri Corridor, a mere 22 kilometers at its narrowest.

Known as the Chicken's Neck, this strip is flanked by Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh, making it a strategic vulnerability.

Yunus's suggestion that Bangladesh could serve as a gateway for Chinese goods to reach global markets via its ports underscores this fragility.

If realized, such a role could boost the Seven Sisters' economy by easing their landlocked constraints.

But it also raises alarms in New Delhi , where China's growing presence in Bangladesh is seen as a direct threat to northeastern connectivity.

Chattogram, handling 92% of Bangladesh's trade, is central to Yunus's vision. The Chinese economic zone there mirrors projects like Sri Lanka's Hambantota, where port investments deepened economic reliance on Beijing.

Mongla's modernization complements this, creating a dual-port strategy that strengthens Bangladesh's maritime profile.

Reports of a Chinese-backed airbase at Lal Munirat, just 60 kilometers from the Siliguri Corridor, add a security dimension.

Described as a training facility for Bangladeshi pilots flying 16 Chinese J-10C fighters, its proximity fuels fears of wartime utility.

For India, these developments threaten not just access to its northeast but the broader balance of power, as Bangladesh edges closer to China's orbit.


China's Strategic Footprint: A Network Around India
China's investments in Bangladesh fit a broader pattern: a network of ports and infrastructure across the Indian Ocean, often termed the String of Pearls, designed to secure trade routes and project influence.

From Gwadar in Pakistan to Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Beijing has steadily built assets that flank India.

Mongla and Chattogram, alongside agreements to share hydrological data on the Yarlung Zangbo and Yamuna rivers, integrate Bangladesh into this framework, enhancing China's access to the Bay of Bengal.

For India, with a $3 trillion economy and global ambitions, this feels like a tightening grip, especially as China's claims on Arunachal Pradesh and influence in Nepal and Bhutan grow.

Bangladesh's endorsement of the One China principle during Yunus's visit, affirming Taiwan as part of China, aligns Dhaka with Beijing's global narrative.

While a diplomatic formality, it carries risks: tacitly supporting China's stance could embolden Beijing's ambitions, from Taiwan to the South China Sea, complicating Bangladesh's neutrality.

For New Delhi, this alignment underscores the stakes-losing Bangladesh as a reliable partner could unravel decades of regional influence, particularly after Hasina's pro-India tenure.


Bangladesh's Ambition Amid Domestic Realities
At home, Yunus's pivot stirs debate. Bangladesh's 170 million people and $400 billion economy demand stability, and Chinese investments promise jobs and growth.

In Dhaka's markets, traders eye Chattogram's potential; in rural villages, farmers hope for economic ripple effects.

Yet skepticism persists. Memories of Sri Lanka's debt struggles loom, and Yunus's unelected status-leading an interim government without a public mandate-invites scrutiny. Can he deliver prosperity without ceding sovereignty?

Relations with India add complexity. Reports of tensions over Bangladesh's Hindu minority, amplified by Indian media, strain ties. India's recent moves, like reevaluating transshipment agreements, signal frustration.

Yunus's request for a meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi reflects a desire to mend fences, but his Beijing visit has already shifted perceptions, casting Bangladesh as a nation charting its own course, even if it risks alienating a historic ally.


A Region in Motion
South Asia is no static chessboard; it is a stage of rapid realignment. India, bolstering its northeastern infrastructure and ties with Bhutan and Nepal, seeks to counter China's advances.

The U.S., under Trump's inward focus, leans on India to check Beijing, leaving Bangladesh to navigate a narrowing path. Smaller states watch closely-Nepal's hydropower deals with China, the Maldives' debt dilemmas-knowing Dhaka's choices could sway their own.

Yunus has positioned Bangladesh as a vital link-not just for the Seven Sisters but for Asia's future trade.

Yet this role demands balance. Tilt too far toward China, and India's cooperation, crucial for overland routes, may wane.

Rely too heavily on Beijing's funds, and Dhaka risks a debt trap. Success hinges on pragmatism: leveraging China's resources while preserving ties with India and the West.
A Path Forward, Watched by the World
Bangladesh's Independence Day turn toward China is a gamble grounded in necessity and vision. Yunus seeks to elevate his nation from regional player to maritime hub, a bridge between giants.

For India, the challenge is to secure its northeast without alienating Dhaka; for China, to expand influence without overreaching.

As Bangladesh steps boldly into this contest, its choices will echo beyond its shores, shaping South Asia's delicate balance.

Will Dhaka unlock prosperity for the Seven Sisters or deepen India's vulnerabilities? The world watches, waiting for the next move in a region where every decision counts.

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