Ecuador's Tough On Crime Approach Is Popular, But Major Challenges Remain

(MENAFN- The Conversation) Ecuadorean President Daniel Noboa moved quickly to impose the rule of law immediately after his surprise election victory in 2023. In the short-term, the results of the country's youngest ever leader were impressive, including a reported 18% decline in murder in 2024 . The president's administration also reportedly increased drug seizures by over 30% – up from 188 tons in 2023 to 250 tons last year . Despite what some observers describe as a year of chaos, this has made him popular among many Ecuadorians.

A central thrust of the president's tough-on-crime strategy involves the imposition of states of emergency and the consolidation of security institutions under his control. Launched in early January 2024, the so-called Bloque de Seguridad strategy integrates the police, armed forces and ministries of interior and national defence. Prisons have also been declared“security zones” and are firmly under the control of the police and military. The president promises to do more of the same if he is re-elected on Feb. 9, 2025.

The risks of militarized security

While the militarization of public security has helped reduce sky-high homicide rates, this is only part of the story. Incidents of extortion and kidnapping actually increased last year, suggesting that far from being dismantled, several criminal organizations may be changing their tactics. The head of the national agency responsible for fighting violent crime, DINASED, claims that criminal groups are diversifying into new illicit economies in order to survive.

One of the limitations of the Ecuadorian government's response to organized crime is the absence of preventive measures to keep young people from joining criminal groups in the first place. While there is ample support to crack down on criminals, there is appetite for social, educational, and economic initiatives to encourage at-risk to avoid crime altogether. If there is any home of weakening the structures and networks of crime in the longer-term, more comprehensive strategies are needed.

Another concern is that militarized security responses could give rise to new armed groups, including paramilitaries. While there is still limited evidence of paramilitary activity in Ecuador, the risk is real. Afterall, there is a tradition of so-called“autodefense” and“militia” across the Americas. Meanwhile, researchers have documented over 160“criminal sanctuaries” (especially in the country's Guayas and Esmeraldas provinces) where local gangs offer protection in return for“law and order”.

A related worry among analysts is that harsh crackdown on criminal groups while improving some aspects of public security, may unintentionally contribute to structural transformation of the organized crime landscape. In Ecuador, as in other parts of Latin America, the risks appear to be particularly acute within the prison system itself. Indeed, over the past five years, criminal groups embedded in the penitentiary system have expanded operations nationwide.

As in countries like Colombia and Mexico, Ecuador's criminal networks are using violence to coerce and corrupt local politicians. In some cases, crime groups force local authorities to pay them in return for“protection”. Over time this degrades the latter's authority and legitimacy and entrenches a kind of criminal governance. The so-called“Metastasis scandal” is revealing. Last year, Ecuador's Attorney General accused 13 people, including politicians and prosecutors, of being involved in the largest case of corruption and drug trafficking in the country's history.

Despite repeated police and military interventions to assert control over Ecuador's penitentiaries, there are still signs of lively criminal economies within the prison walls. Some of these appear to persist on account of involvement of corrupt police and prison guards officials. And even as the Noboa administration cracks down on criminal entities such as Los Choneros, Los Lobos and Los Tiguerones , their fragmentation has resulted in hyper-violent internal power struggles .

Resorting to states of emergency

While controversial, the Ecuadorian authorities have issued roughly half a dozen states of emergency since 2022. Some of these are restricted to specific provinces where crime“hotspots” persist. Ecuador's Constitutional Court recently curbed Noboa's emergency decrees, citing lack of justification for“internal armed conflict” and unconstitutional restrictions on rights . These rulings likewise stressed the need for lawful security measures rather than resorting to emergency decrees.

Ecuador was under a state of emergency for more than 250 days in 2024. The latest state of emergency, issued in January this year , grants broad powers to security forces and calls for the deployment of the national police and armed forces into affected areas and prisons. It also permits inspections, searches, and seizures without a warrant, curbs privacy controls and facilitates arbitrary surveillance. Curfews between 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. are enforced in over 22 municipalities.

Not surprisingly, human rights groups have sounded the alarm , linking the government's hardline approach to violations of civil liberties on the street and in prisons. Social movements in Guayaquil and towns along the coast have carried-out protests, even as criminal violence escalates. Working in highly insecure conditions, rights activists and defenders continue to mobilize, though public support for Noboa's law and order approach remains high .

The enduring appeal of 'mano dura' in the Americas

The spread and influence of transnational organized crime is generating complex challenges across Latin America. On the one hand, it is contributing to rising violence in countries with historically low homicide rates including Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru. On the other hand, it is generating rising insecurity in countries that are experiencing stable or declining homicide rates such as Brazil, Colombia, Panama and across Central America and the Caribbean.

The hyper-aggressive response of certain governments to organized crime is getting considerable attention. The approach adopted by Nayib Bukele in El Salvador since 2022 is widely admired, including by officials in the new Trump administration in the U.S . Similar approaches were also put in place in neighboring Honduras as well as by Noboa in Ecuador. As admiration of Bukele grows , so to the attraction to so-called“mano dura” – or“iron fist” – measures across the region, including the imposition of states of emergency.

Ecuador's states of emergency are already generating reverberations across South America. On the one hand, they are being watched closely by political authorities in neighboring countries: if they are seen to be effective, then they will likely be emulated. On the other hand, they are also being monitored by civil society and human rights activists who are deeply concerned that such approaches may be emulated in ways that undermine basic freedoms and liberties.

There are other practical ways in which Ecuador's states of emergency are generating regional impacts. The fragmentation of criminal organizations means that some are relocating to areas far from state control, including near frontiers and neighboring countries. This could lead to so-called“contagion”,“displacement” or“balloon” effects, including across international borders. This could lead to a surge in criminal economies, as well as other externalities such as population displacement and migration.

Ecuador's next president must adopt a comprehensive approach to tackling organized crime. Disrupting the country's 22 criminal groups will require cooperation with international partners to take-on the Colombian, Mexican, and Albanian drug trafficking and money laundering networks that back them. It will also involve reversing the infiltration of criminal networks into politics, many of which are corrupting politicians, prosecutors, police and prison guards. Preventive measures targeting impacted communities and poorly managed prisons are likewise essential if Ecuador stands a chance of changing course.

This article was originally published in Portuguese

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